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Abstract 
A wide array of neurobiological, neuropsychological and cognitive models have 
been formulated in an attempt to explain the development and persistence of 
obsessive-compulsive checking. Memory processes, including impaired memory 
for actions and confidence in memory, and cognitive variables such as 
exaggerated threat appraisal, inflated personal responsibility and 'intolerance to 
uncertainty, have received much attention in recent years. Although researchers 
generally agree that multiple factors are likely to be involved in this disorder, a 
coherent model articulating the contribution and relative importance and 
contributions of each has not been forthcoming. This review provides an 
overview of obsessive-compulsive checking and research efforts in the fields of 
memory and cognitive psychology with regard to this disorder. Limitations of the 
existing research are discussed to highlight barriers to the development of a more 
complete understanding of checking behaviour. 
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Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is characterised by the presence of 
obsessions or compulsions that are a significant source of distress, are time-
consuming, and cause significant impairment in daily functioning (American 
Psychiatric Association (APA), 1994). Typically, OCD is further classified 
according to the theme of the obsession or associated compulsion. Checking 
rituals, cleaning rituals, counting, ordering and obsessional slowness are among 
the most common forms of the disorder (Jenike, 1995). 
Despite being one of the most common psychiatric conditions with a worldwide 
prevalence of approximately 2% of the general population (Sasson, Zohar, 
Chopra, Lustig, Iancu & Hendler, 1997), the aetiology of OCD has proven 
difficult to determine. Moreover, although there is growing evidence suggesting 
distinct aetiological pathways for the various OCD subtypes (Matsunaga, Kiriike, 
Matsui, Iwasaki, Koshimune, Ohya et al., 2001), relatively few researchers have 
investigated such differences until recently. 
With regard to obsessive-compulsive checking, neurobiological, 
neuropsychological, cognitive appraisal and memory impairment models currently 
compete in the literature. However, although it is widely agreed that multiple 
factors are likely to be aetiologically important in the development of compulsive 
checking, agreement about the specific factors involved, relative contributions of 
each and interactions between the factors has not been reached. A more complete 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of obsessive-compulsive checking, 
and other forms of the disorder, should therefore be an important priority for 
psychological research. 
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This review critically examines several of the potential cognitive mediators and 
memory processes hypothesised to underlie the development of obsessive-
compulsive checking. Commencing with a description of the disorder and its 
epidemiology and natural course, the review then presents an historical account of 
OCD theories. A brief summary of the neurobiological and neuropsychological 
research is provided, followed by a more extensive critique of the extensive 
literature concerning memory phenomena implicated in obsessive-compulsive 
checking. Research investigating deficits in memory for actions and memory 
confidence is critically examined. The literature review then explores the 
burgeoning cognitive literature. Aetiological models proposing a central role of 
exaggerated threat appraisal, inflated personal responsibility and intolerance for 
uncertainty are reviewed. Finally, a summary of the key findings is presented, 
along with a discussion concerning the methodological impediments of the 
existing research and suggestions for future investigations. 
Obsessive-Compulsive Checking: an Overview 
Description and Diagnostic Features 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is characterised by obsessions and/or 
compulsions that are time-consuming, cause clinically significant distress and 
impairment in daily functioning (APA, 1994). Obsessions are recurrent or 
persistent thoughts, impulses or images that are experienced at some time during 
the course of the disturbance as intrusive and distressing and, with the exception 
of children, are irrational and the product of the individual's own mind (APA, 
1994). 
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Compulsions are repetitive behaviours or mental acts that the individual feels 
driven to perform in response to an obsession or according to rules that must be 
rigidly followed. Generally, compulsions are aimed at reducing distress 
associated with having the obsession, or preventing some dreaded event or 
situation from occurring. However, compulsions are usually not realistically 
connected with the situation or are clearly excessive (APA, 1994). The 
obsessions or compulsions must not be restricted to another Axis I disorder (e.g., a 
preoccupation with food in the presence of an eating disorder) or be related to the 
direct physiological effects of a general medical condition or a substance (APA, 	CC) 
1994). 	 P., 
0 
Clinical obsessions and compulsions are typically limited and stereotyped, 
generally falling into four main categories: contamination fears, pathological 
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doubt, intrusive sexual, blasphemous, or aggressive thoughts, and obsessional 
slowness (Kolada, Bland & Newman, 1994; Sasson et al., 1997). Contamination 
fears are one of the most common obsessions, reported by up to 55% of all OCD 
patients (Kolada et al., 1994). Intrusive urges or thoughts of a sexual, 
blasphemous, or aggressive nature are reported in approximately 25% of patients 
(Kolada et al., 1994) and are often associated with covert mental strategies such as 
counting, praying, or ordering (Sasson et al., 1997). Obsessional slowness, 
characterised by a need to have things "just right" (Sasson et al., 1997), is less 
commonly observed in clinical settings (Rachman & Shafran, 1998). 
Pathological doubt or "checking" is commonly reported among individuals with 
OCD (Kolada et al., 1994). Typically, obsessions concern doubt about whether a 
particular action has been performed (e.g., turning off the stove, locking the door), 
or the repeated concern that one has harmed someone through an action (e.g., the 
possibility of having hurt someone while driving) (Sasson et al., 1997). Checking 
compulsions presumably develop because they serve to lower the likelihood of the 
feared outcome (e.g., fire as a result of the stove being left on) (Rachman & 
Shafran, 1998). Alternatively, "undoing" rituals, such as counting, praying, or 
ordering, are sometimes also performed (Sasson et al., 1997). 
Age of Onset, Course and Prevalence 
The onset of OCD symptoms tends to be gradual rather than acute (Jenike, 1995), 
generally occurring during the early to mid-20s (Bebbington, 1998), although 
children as young as ten years of age have been reported to show compulsive 
behaviours (Thomsen, 1993). In light of this, several researchers have proposed a 
bimodal age of onset pattern, with peaks occurring between 10-14 years and 20- 
22 years of age (e.g., Henin, Savage, Rauch, Deckersbach, Wilhelm, Baer et al., 
2001; Kolada et al., 1994). Individuals with checking compulsions or mixed 
rituals tend to have an earlier age of onset than individuals with washing concerns 
(Minichiello, Baer, Jenike & Holland, 1990). Additionally, men generally have 
an earlier age of symptom onset compared with women (Jenike, 1995; Minichiello 
et al., 1990). 
OCD is typically a chronic disorder with a fluctuating course (Jenike, 1995), with 
different symptoms predominating at particular points over the course of the 
individual's life (Sasson et al., 1997). Most individuals present with a 
combination of obsessive symptoms (Marks, 1987) and a high number of 
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comorbid disorders including depression, other anxiety disorders, eating 
disorders, substance abuse, schizophrenia and personality disorders (APA, 1994; 
Sasson et al., 1997). Although several effective treatments exist, complete 
remission of symptoms is unfortunately rare (Jenike, 1995). 
Research from large scale studies (e.g., Kolada et al., 1994; Samuels & Nestadt, 
1997; Zohar, Apter, King, Pauls, Leckman & Cohen, 1999) and cross-national 
epidemiological research (e.g., Horwath & Weissman, 2000; Weissman, Bland, 
Canino, Greenwald, Hwu, Lee, et al., 1994) have consistently shown relatively 
high prevalence rates of between 1.9% and 5% worldwide for OCD, that are 
similar for males and females (Bebbington, 1998). Currently, the worldwide 
prevalence of the disorder is generally accepted to be around 2% of the population 
(Sasson et al., 1997), placing OCD as the fourth most common psychiatric 
disorder (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1994) affecting an estimated 50 million people 
world-wide (Sasson et al., 1997). 
Normal and Abnormal Obsessions 
Most individuals exhibit thoughts or behaviours that are remarkably similar to the 
obsessions and compulsions characterising OCD (e.g., Muris, Merckelbach & 
Clavan, 1997; Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984), and 
differ only in frequency, intensity, and discomfort (Burns, Keortge, Formea & 
Stemberger, 1996; Rassin, Muris, Schmidt & Merckelbach, 2000). Mataix-Cols, 
Vallejo and Sanchez-Turet (2000) concluded that obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena are dimensionally distributed in the general population. Additionally, 
several studies have shown that obsessive-compulsive symptoms are relatively 
6 
stable in nonclinical groups (e.g., Burns et al., 1996; Morris, Forbes, Bradley & 
Goodman, 2000). Consequently, it has been possible to use subclinical samples in 
research investigating the aetiology of OCD. 
OCD Subtypes: Evidence for Distinctive Aetiologies 
Recent investigations indicate that OCD may not be an homogenous disorder; the 
various subtypes described may actually represent distinct disorders. As 
previously discussed, the various OCD subtypes are generally characterised by 
different ages of symptom onset (Minichiello et al., 1990). There is also evidence 
for differences in the types of cognitions or beliefs associated with washing and 
checking subtypes (e.g., Overton & Menzies, 2002). 
Several researchers have further hypothesised that the various subtypes are 
differentially mediated, at least in part, by different neuroanatomical circuits: 
"...it is possible that distinct OCD patient subgroups manifest different 
impairments within the circuit connecting the orbitofrontal cortex, the basal 
ganglia, and thalamus" (Wilson, 1998, p. 168). Compelling experimental 
evidence is emerging in support of this hypothesis. For example, Phillips, Marks, 
Senior, Lythgoe, O'Dwyer, Meehan, et al. (2000) found evidence of a differential 
neural response between OCD washers and checkers when presented with pictures 
designed to elicit disgust. 
Despite the emerging evidence in favour of distinct neuroanatomical structures, 
developmental pathways and cognitive features among the OCD subtypes, 
contemporary research into memory and cognitive features of the disorder is 
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largely derived from studies using mixed symptom profiles. The extent to which 
the findings of such studies are specific to obsessive-compulsive checking is 
therefore unclear. However, due to the relative paucity of studies employing 
"pure" checking samples, the inclusion of studies examining mixed profile groups 
in the present literature review is unavoidable. 
In the subsequent sections of this literature review, efforts have been made to 
distinguish clearly between those studies investigating solely obsessive-
compulsive checking and those that have included heterogenous samples. 
Similarly, clinical and nonclinical populations are explicitly defined wherever 
possible in the following review of the literature. 
Theories of OCD: Historical Explanations 
There is some evidence that the first descriptions of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms were documented in Mesopotamia over 4000 years ago (Frazier & 
Goldstein, 1987, as cited in Kolada et al., 1994). However, it was not until the 
Middle Ages that the first theoretical accounts of OCD emerged. These models 
were strongly influenced by the dominant religious beliefs of the time. For 
example, the Malleus Maleficarum (Witch's Hammer), an Inquisition treatise on 
psychopathology and witchcraft, contained a description of what would now be 
considered a compulsion (Kraemer & Sprenger, 1486 as cited in Sasson et al., 
1997). As evident in this text, blasphemous or sexual thoughts were presumed to 
be signs of being "possessed". Accordingly, the treatment of choice during this 
period was exorcism to expel the unfortunate soul of evil (Jenike, 1995). 
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Although surprisingly effective for some individuals, many more were not 
"cured" of their affliction and not all survived the "treatment". 
Fortunately, over time the religious explanation of OCD was abandoned in favour 
of a medical aetiology. Jean Etienne Dominique Esquirol is credited with 
providing the first account of OCD in the psychiatric literature in 1838 (Jenike, 
1995). By the end of the 19th  century, the medical view considered that the 
symptoms of OCD were a manifestation of melancholia or depression (Jenike, 
1995). This model predominated until well into the 20 th  century when theories of 
OCD started to focus on the psychological aspects of the disorder. 
Sigmund Freud's influential psychoanalytical view became the prevailing 
aetiological theory of OCD in the early part of the 20 th  Century (Kolada et al., 
1994). According to Freud, the obsessive state was a manifestation of 
psychological defenses against repressed memories of sexual guilt (Carr, 1974); a 
view famously recorded in Freud's description of the `Rat Man' in 1909 (Freud, 
1909 as cited in Esman, 2001). 
Psychoanalytical models predominated until the 1950s when researchers began 
applying learning theories to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Wolpe (1958) 
regarded obsessions and compulsions as conditioned avoidance responses arising 
from traumatic experiences. Specifically, the behavioural model of OCD 
proposed that obsessions were internal stimuli that had become the focus of 
anxiety. Compulsions were viewed as conditioned avoidance responses that 
served to provide immediate anxiety reduction, and therefore prevent habituation, 
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resulting in a perpetuation of the compulsive behaviours (Salkovskis, Forrester & 
Richards, 1998). 
Despite the popularity of behavioural models and the effective treatment 
techniques they have spawned (Marks, 1987), researchers have long recognised 
that they do not sufficiently account for all OCD phenomenology (Jenike, 1995). 
Consequently, several researchers have focussed on exploring a neurobiological 
basis of OCD. Further, there has been a growing appreciation that the symptoms 
of obsessive-compulsive checking may be at least partly attributable to memory 
dysfunction. Finally, "obsessions are, by definition, a cognitive phenomena and 
play a crucial role in triggering compulsions" (Ladoucer, Leger, Rheaume & 
Dube, 1996, p. 767). Hence, there is also growing interest in the role of cognition 
in the development and maintenance of OCD. 
Neurobiological Factors 
Using research exploiting advances in neuroimaging techniques and gene 
technologies, substantial progress in delineating some of the potential genes and 
neurological structures involved in the development of OCD has been made. 
Genetic Factors 
Reviews of the genetic literature and meta-analyses have indicated that OCD is far 
more common in first-degree relatives than in the general population, with 
heritability reported to be around 30-40% (Heteema, Neale & Kendle, 2001; 
Thomsen, 1997). Evidence for a moderate genetic influence has also been found 
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using twin studies, however findings of discordant monozygotic twins rule out a 
completely penetrant hereditary transmission of OCD (Kolada et al., 1994). 
Individual environmental factors are therefore very influential in the development 
of the disorder (Heteema et al., 2001). 
Pato, Pato and Pauls (2002) believe that progress in determining the genetic 
mechanisms involved in the expression of OCD have been hindered by two 
factors: the heterogeneity of clinical presentations and a lack of understanding at 
the molecular level. A lack of well-controlled twin studies represents another 
limitation of the existing research (Heteema et al., 2001; Thomsen, 1997). Studies 
addressing these issues would assist in identifying the specific locus of the genes 
involved and, in doing so, provide an opportunity to determine the environmental 
factors critical in the development of the full-blown condition. 
Neurotransmitter Abnormalities 
Based on findings of symptom improvement in response to serotonergic 
antidepressants (SSRIs), several researchers have hypothesised that individuals 
with OCD have low levels of the neurotransmitter, serotonin (Baumgarten & 
Grozdanovic, 1998). There are several lines of converging evidence for this 
hypothesis. Firstly, abnormal levels of a cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) serotonin 
metabolite, CSF-5-HIAA, have been reported in untreated individuals with OCD 
(Jenike, 1995; Micallef & Blin, 2001). Secondly, studies in both laboratory 
animals and humans in controlled clinical trials have shown that these levels 
return to normal after treatment with serotonergic antidepressants but not with 
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors or dopamine antagonists, providing further 
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evidence for a serotonin specific effect (Blier & Abbott, 2001; Micallef & Blin, 
2001). 
The serotonergic hypothesis however, does not account for the finding that 
serotonin depletion does not exacerbate OCD symptoms (Delgado & Moreno, 
1998). Further, not all patients with OCD respond to SSRI medications and 
elevated levels of CSF serotonergic metabolites do not correlate with OCD 
symptom ratings (Baumgarten & Grozdanovic, 1998). Finally, low baseline 
levels of CSF-S-HIAA have not been found to be reliably different in OCD 
(Baumgarten & Grozdanovic, 1998) and genetic research to determine the 
transmission of variants of genes coding for serotonergic structures has produced 
conflicting results (e.g., Di Bella, Cristina & Bell, 2002). 
Therefore, while serotonin may be involved in OCD, there is little evidence for a 
causative role. Jenike (1995) also suggests that several studies indicate the 
involvement of other neurotransmitter systems. 
Neurological Anomalies 
Reviews of functional neuroimaging studies reveal that hypermetabolism in the 
orbitofrontal cortex, caudate nucleus, thalamus and anterior cingulate gyms have 
consistently been found (e.g., Micalief & Blin, 2001; Saxena, Brody, Schwartz & 
Baxter, 1998). Imaging studies have generally shown hypermetabolism in the 
orbitofrontal regions at rest, and hyperactivity in the striatum and limbic areas 
during symptom provocation (Hoehn-Saric & Greenberg, 1997). Studies of 
neurological electrical activity have confirmed this pattern of increased frontal 
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activation during symptom provocation (e.g., Blair-Simpson, Tenke, Towey, 
Liebowitz & Bruder, 2000). Further, volumetric computed tomographic research 
has demonstrated bilaterally decreased caudate volumes in OCD patients 
compared with nonclinical controls (Jenike, 1995). 
Veale, Sahalcian, Owen and Marks (1996) concluded that the findings appear to 
implicate dysfunction in the neural networks connecting the basal ganglia and 
frontal lobes. However, other researchers have suggested a more global 
disruption to normal brain development or in the myelination process due to 
findings of significantly reduced total white matter associated with increased total 
cortex and opercular volumes (Jenike, Breiter, Baer, Kennedy, Savage, Olivares, 
et al., 1996). 
Summary 
Research has shown that a genetic contribution is evident in OCD, but does not 
account for all cases, implying that environmental factors are also necessary for 
the development of the disorder. The specific genes involved have not been 
consistently identified however, and therefore the transmission of the disorder 
remains unknown. Similarly, although serotonin appears to play a role in OCD, it 
does not appear to be causative and other neurotransmitter systems are likely to be 
involved. Finally, although the neurological and neuroimaging research has 
reported reasonably consistent abnormalities, the specific biological processes 
involved and the functional significance of such anomalies is not yet understood 
(Gehring, Himle & Nisenson, 2000). 
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Savage, Deckersbach, Wilhelm, Rauch, Baer, Reid et al. (2000) point out that the 
underlying neuropathology of OCD is likely to be attributable to subtle 
morphological abnormalities and disrupted function in widely distributed neural 
systems rather than a gross lesion. Therefore, specific conclusions regarding the 
underlying neuropathology of the disorder might be better made on the basis of 
functional imaging studies employing cognitive activation paradigms. Finally, as 
it has not been conclusively established that the abnormalities identified are an 
underlying cause in contrast to a consequence of OCD, such research should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Neuropsychological Research 
Neuropsychological research has allowed the gaps between the neurological 
structures and processes identified in OCD and their psychological functions to be 
bridged to some extent. Deficits in several areas have been reported on the basis 
of neuropsychological assessments, including exaggerated startle reflex, saccadic 
eye movement programming and motor difficulties (Greisberg & McKay, 2003; 
Wilson, 1998). However, the most consistent findings have been obtained in the 
areas of visuospatial performance, attentional impairments, executive functioning 
and memory (Wilson, 1998). As memory abnormalities, including visual memory 
deficits have been among the most extensively studied in the neuropsychological 
research (Savage et al., 2000), the literature on memory functions will be 
examined separately. 
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Visuospatial Deficits 
One of the most consistent findings of neuropsychological testing in heterogenous 
OCD samples is lowered scores on a range of visuospatial tasks. In a review of 
neuropsychological research into OCD, Schultz, Evans and Wolff (1999) found 
that studies generally show a consistent pattern of deficits in response inhibition, 
visual memory and visuoperceptual functioning. Poor performance on 
visuospatial tasks is believed to implicate frontostriatal dysfunction (Tallis, 1997) 
lending support to the findings of neurobiological research. Veale et al. (1996) 
further proposed that basal ganglia dysfunction is also indicated, as lesions within 
these structures are associated with visuospatial defects. However, Cox (1997) 
reported that the literature shows inconsistent difficulties with visual perceptual 
discrimination, visual and working memory, and visuomotor tasks in OCD. 
Therefore, further research to address the inconsistencies in the literature on 
visuospatial deficits is required. 
Attention and Response Inhibition 
In general, inconsistent findings with regard to performance on attention tasks 
have been obtained, perhaps reflecting the diverse methodologies employed 
across studies. Conversely, relatively consistent results revealing differences in 
allocation of attention, regardless of whether measured by evoked potentials, eye 
movements or reaction time methods, have been found (Cox, 1997). 
For example, Martin, Wiggs, Altemus, Rubenstein and Murphy (1995) found no 
evidence of deficits in working memory (an index of attentional functioning) in 
OCD participants, although significantly slower performance on a self-ordered 
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pointing task relative to controls, implicating attention allocation deficits. 
Similarly, although Papageorgiou, Rabavilas, Liappas and Stefanis (2003) found 
significantly reduced P300 amplitudes at right prefrontal areas and a longer P300 
latency at central prefrontal sites in participants with OCD, indicating 
abnormalities in working memory and attentional processing, there was no deficit 
with regard to overt working memory performance. Finally, Gehring et al. (2000) 
reported electrophyisological data suggesting dysfunction in action monitoring (a 
measure of attention allocation) but no differences in accuracy or error measures 
on a Stroop task. 
Deficits in Executive Functioning 
Due to the inconsistent findings with regard to attentional processes, Greisberg 
and McKay (2003) proposed that a more general deficit in executive functions, 
particularly organisational strategies, might underlie OCD. In line with this 
hypothesis, Veale et al. (1996) reported that 40 participants with OCD were as 
accurate as controls on various neuropsychological tests, but slower in generating 
alternative solutions when a mistake occurred, and had difficulties in shifting 
between sets. Similarly, a study by Savage et al. (2000) assessing strategic 
processing and memory performance in OCD reported that deficits on free recall 
of verbal and nonverbal information were attributable to executive function 
impairments. 
These findings were interpreted as implicating a range of executive function 
deficits including increased distractibility to competing stimuli, excessive 
monitoring and checking of responses, and perseveration when an error is made. 
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Further, both researchers concluded that a primary deficit in strategic processing 
is consistent with neurobiological models hypothesising frontostriatal dysfunction. 
Summary 
Wilson (1998) reported that although deficits in set-shifting, hyperattention and 
visuospatial construction have been found, these findings have not been replicated 
consistently. Also, despite the strong neurological evidence implicating the 
prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia in OCD, Cox (1997) found that traditional 
neuropsychological measures of these neural substrates were reduced only in 
participants with comorbid depression, obsessional slowness, many neurological 
soft signs, Tourette's syndrome and/or lower intellectual ability. 
Methodological problems associated with small sample sizes, the use of 
heterogenous OCD samples and failure to control for medication status or 
comorbid disorders, in addition to the diverse experimental paradigms and stimuli 
used, are likely to have contributed to the confusing pattern of results. Therefore, 
replication of existing experimental procedures employing more stringent 
exclusion criteria may clarify the nature and extent of the neuropsychological 
impairments implicated in obsessive-compulsive checking. Additionally, several 
researchers have suggested that combining neuropsychological assessment with 
neuroimaging methods promises to delineate the pathobiology of OCD, and its 
subtypes, more precisely (e.g., Schultz et al., 1999; Wilson, 1998). 
17 
Impaired Memory Processes 
Individuals who check excessively frequently report doubting their ability to 
recall accurately whether they have carried out a task adequately, if at all 
(Rachman & Shafran, 1998), even in the presence of decisive and normally doubt-
reducing information (Tallis, 1997). Accordingly, several researchers have 
proposed that impairments in memory processes may be important in obsessive-
compulsive checking. 
Although a substantial body of research has examined verbal and implicit memory 
processes in OCD, inconsistent results have been found (Greisberg & McKay, 
2003). In contrast, the neuropsychological literature has produced more robust 
findings with regard to visual memory deficits, namely impairments on a range of 
visual free recall and recognition tasks (e.g., Dirson, Bouvard, Cottraux & Martin, 
1995; Tallis, Pratt & Jamani, 1999). Nevertheless, there are also several 
conflicting results in the literature (for reviews see Tallis, 1997; Woods, Vevea, 
Chambless & Bayen, 2002) as discussed previously. Consequently, several 
researchers have hypothesised that the observed memory deficits may be a 
manifestation of other higher order memory processes including memory for 
actions and reduced memory confidence. This research is critically examined in 
the following sections. 
Impaired Memory for Actions 
Sher, Frost and Otto (1983) proposed that compulsive checking might arise, in 
part, from poorer memory for actions. Other researchers have noted that this 
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hypothesis compliments clinical observations showing that checkers commonly 
express doubts about their memory of previous actions (Woods et al., 2002). 
In a study designed to test whether memory disturbances were associated with 
compulsive checking, Sher et al. (1983) reported that high-checking students had 
poorer memory for actions compared with noncheckers and underestimated their 
performance on a reality-monitoring task. These impairments were not observed 
in nonclinical cleaners, indicating they were specific to checking behaviour. In a 
subsequent study, Sher, Mann and Frost (1984) found that more frequent checking 
behaviour in a student sample was related to poorer overall memory performance 
and there was a tendency for checkers to have poorer memory for actions. State 
anxiety or depression did not account for the lower memory performance. It 
should be noted however, that despite the finding of a lower memory performance 
in checkers, all experimental groups fell within the normal range. Thus, the 
conclusion of impaired memory performance in checkers in this study is tenuous. 
In a final study Sher, Frost, Kushner, Crews & Alexander (1989), using a 
psychiatric outpatient sample, found that checkers again had an overall memory 
deficit in addition to impaired recall, but not recognition, for actions. Further the 
frequency of checking behaviour was negatively related to memory functioning, 
greater levels of general psychopathology and neuroticism. 
Rubenstein, Peynircioglu, Chambless and Pigott (1993) obtained similar findings 
in a series of experiments involving the performance of actions in different 
modalities, and recall and recognition of cartoons and word-pair lists in 20 
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subclinical checking students compared with 20 healthy students. Overall, the 
results showed that high checking students remembered fewer actions and 
confused whether they had performed, observed or written a given action, making 
more errors of commission than the normal sample. The deficit appeared to be 
specific to the performance of the high checking students' own actions, with no 
impairments found on recall of cartoons or words. 
Expanding on this research, Ecker and Engelkamp (1995) proposed that memory 
for actions impairments in OCD might be more specifically related to weaker 
motor or kinesthetic components than visual or verbal memory deficits. A study 
comparing memory for actions across four modalities, motor-encoding, motor-
imaginal encoding, visual-imaginal encoding and sub-vocal encoding in 24 OCD 
checkers, 24 high checking controls and 48 low checking controls supported this 
hypothesis. Obsessive-compulsive checkers showed poorer free recall of self-
performed actions that was not related to depression, state-anxiety, or measures of 
doubting, conscientiousness or washing, greater confusion regarding whether an 
item had been motorically or motoric-imaginally encoded and lower motor 
imagery ratings relative to the other groups. Performance on all other memory 
tests was essentially normal. Ecker and Engelkamp (1995) suggested that this 
pattern of results indicated a specific motor memory deficit relating to the 
performance of an individual's own actions in obsessive-compulsive checking. 
Reduced Confidence in Memory 
The finding of impaired memory for actions has been the most consistently 
demonstrated memory deficit in the OCD literature (Tallis, 1997). However, 
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clinical observations have indicated that individuals with checking concerns are 
prone to pathological doubt even in situations where memory ability is irrelevant 
(Tallis, 1997). Concurrently, a growing body of research has found evidence that 
reduced memory confidence, rather than memory deficits per se, characterises 
obsessive-compulsive checking. 
McNally and Kohlbeck (1993) found evidence for this proposal in a study 
comparing reality monitoring, recognition and confidence in recognition, and 
imagery ability between 12 OCD checkers, 12 OCD noncheckers and 12 normal 
controls. The experiment required the participants to trace, imagine tracing or 
look at 60 items comprised of words or simple line drawings. No significant 
differences were found between the groups with regard to reality monitoring, 
recognition of items, errors of commission or perceived imagery ratings. Both 
OCD groups however, expressed significantly less confidence in their memories 
for the activities performed compared with the controls. 
In a more recent study, Merckelbach and Wessel (2000) found further evidence 
for reduced confidence in memory in obsessive-compulsive checking. Nineteen 
OCD patients and 16 matched nonpatient controls were required to either imagine 
performing or actually perform an action they had read from a printed card. 
Regardless of their symptom profile, participants with OCD had slightly superior 
reality-monitoring ability but were far less confident about their correct 
identifications of actions compared with the control group (Merckelbach & 
Wessel, 2000). 
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Similarly, Zitterl, Urban, Linzmayer, Aigner, Demal, Semler, et al. (2001) found 
poorer nonverbal intermediate memory, reduced memory for visual sequences and 
significantly lower confidence in memory, despite similar memory vividness, 
desire for vividness and satisfaction of recall in 27 non-depressed OCD 
(predominantly checking) patients compared with 27 normal controls. 
Reduced memory confidence has also been demonstrated using verbal stimuli. 
MacDonald, Antony, MacLeod and Richter (1997) assessed memory functioning 
in a group of 10 OCD checkers, 10 OCD noncheckers and 10 clinical controls 
using a word-list paradigm. In line with the findings of Zitterl et al. (2001) and 
Merckelbach and Wessel (2000), the OCD group generally underestimated their 
memory abilities despite the absence of any memory impairments. 
Dar, Rish, Hermesh, Taub and Fux (2000) demonstrated that reduced confidence 
in OCD might not be restricted to memory judgements in a study comparing 20 
OCD checkers, 29 Panic Disorder noncheckers and 23 matched healthy controls 
on a 100-item, two-alternative, general knowledge questionnaire. Obsessive-
compulsive checkers reported significantly lower confidence in their answers than 
the control group, in spite of normal memory performance, and confidence was 
inversely related to the severity of their obsessions. 
In an attempt to integrate the findings of increased desire for memory vividness 
and reduced memory confidence, van den Hout and Kindt (2003) proposed that 
repeated checking might decrease memory vividness, and consequently, reduce 
confidence due to increased stimulus familiarity. To test this theory, 20 trials of a 
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computer animated checking sequence with either gas rings or light bulbs were 
presented to healthy participants in a series of three experiments. Ratings of 
checking accuracy and memory vividness, detail, confidence and confidence in 
the outcome of checking were obtained. As predicted, manipulating healthy 
participants to engage in OCD-like checking behaviour was found to reduce 
memory vividness and detail but did not change memory accuracy (van den Hout 
& Kindt, 2003). 
Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, Amir, Street and Foa (2001) also demonstrated a 
decrease in memory confidence associated with repeated exposure. Fourteen 
OCD participants were compared with 14 anxious controls and 14 non-anxious 
controls over six trials involving exposure to 78 items deemed safe, unsafe or 
neutral by the OCD group. The participants were required to recall as many 
objects as possible and rate their confidence in each memory for each trial. The 
results replicated the findings of van den Hout and Kindt (2003) showing no 
deficit in memory accuracy but a progressive decline in memory confidence over 
the trials in the OCD group. 
Not all studies are in agreement with the reduced memory confidence hypothesis 
however. Constans, Foa, Franklin and Mathews (1995) found no difference in 
memory confidence ratings between 12 OCD checkers and seven controls in a 
task that assessed memory for actions by asking participants to either imagine or 
perform a sequence of actions with 20 anxiety provoking or neutral objects. 
Further, the checking group had superior recall of their last actions that appeared 
to be enhanced by higher anxiety levels. However, the checking group reported 
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higher levels of desired memory vividness compared to the control group. 
Constans et al. (1995) concluded that this factor, in combination with cognitive 
variables, such as anticipated disaster and an exaggerated sense of responsibility 
precipitates repeated checking. 
Summary 
A number of different memory phenomena have been studied in recent years in 
OCD, including various visual memory deficits, memory for actions and memory 
confidence. Tallis (1997) in a review of the literature concluded that there was a 
growing body of evidence in support of memory impairments in obsessive-
compulsive checking. In general, a convergence of research suggests that 
obsessive-compulsive checking may be mediated, at least in part, by deficits in 
immediate and delayed visual recall and recognition, impaired visual and motoric 
memory for actions, increased desire for memory vividness and reduced 
confidence in memory. It should be noted however, that these conclusions are 
made on the basis of the results from studies generally employing mixed OCD 
symptom groups. 
Nevertheless, support for these phenomena in relation to obsessive-compulsive 
checking has been found. Woods et al. (2002), in a meta-analysis of 22 studies 
incorporating 794 participants (341 with primary checking concerns), found that 
checkers had poorer performance than non-checkers on explicit memory tasks 
presumed to assess short-term memory. Impairments in episodic long-term 
memory tasks including free recall, cued recall and recognition were also found. 
24 
The largest effect sizes were obtained for recall of actions (0.71) and confidence 
in recognition (0.92). 
However, the small to medium effect sizes found overall prompted Woods et al. 
(2002) to suggest that although a memory impairment might be moderately 
related to checking, it does not completely account for it. That is, the memory 
impairment in OCD may be secondary to higher meta-cognitive functions. Tallis 
et al. (1999), whilst also advising caution in attributing causality, state that the 
failure to establish significant correlations may instead be due to other 
methodological limitations. These limitations will be examined following a 
review of the cognitive research. 
The Role of Cognitive Appraisals in OCD 
Although memory impairments are likely to play a role in obsessive-compulsive 
checking, only modest correlations between memory deficits and OCD symptoms 
have been found (e.g., Woods et al., 2002). Further, these impairments do not 
sufficiently account for the restricted range of obsessions and compulsions 
observed in OCD (Tallis, 1997). Consequently, several researchers have 
suggested that cognitive processes are also likely to be involved in the emergence 
and maintenance of checking behaviour. 
A convergence of findings suggests that cognitions regarding inflated personal 
responsibility, over-estimation of threat, intolerance to uncertainty, excessive 
thought control or over-importance of thoughts and thought-action fusion are 
25 
important in the maintenance of OCD (Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group, (OCCWG) 1997; Rachman & Shafran, 1998; Steketee, Frost & 
Cohen, 1998). However, relatively little research has been conducted with regard 
to the role of thought control in obsessive-compulsive checking and the literature 
on thought-action fusion suggests that this variable may be more important in 
cases of obsessional impulses (Rassin et al., 2000; Shafran, Thordarson & 
Rachman, 1996). Accordingly, this review provides a critique of the research 
investigating over-estimation of threat, inflated personal responsibility and 
intolerance to uncertainty. 
Exaggerated Threat Appraisal 
Based on Lazarus' (1966 as cited in Carr, 1974) concept of 'threat appraisal' Can 
(1974) proposed that the development of highly circumscribed compulsions in 
OCD is the result of an interaction between high subjective probability estimates 
and situation-specific cost estimates of the perceived outcome. That is, 
individuals with OCD are believed to exaggerate both the likelihood of an 
aversive outcome (e.g., fire) and the cost of the possible outcome (e.g., loss of 
home) relative to other individuals. 
McFall and Wollersheim (1979) expanded this theory by integrating cognitive-
behavioural concepts, such as Beck's cognitive model of anxiety (e.g., Beck, 
Laude & Bohnert, 1974) and identifying a role for irrational beliefs. The 
researchers proposed that a primary appraisal process, characterised by several 
irrational beliefs (i.e., the need to be perfect, mistakes should be punished, certain 
thoughts and feelings are unacceptable and individuals can initiate or prevent the 
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occurrence of disastrous outcomes) produces increased anxiety. A secondary 
underestimation of available coping resources then occurs. Feelings of loss of 
control, uncertainty and further anxiety result, and lead to the obsessions and 
compulsions that distinguish the disorder (McFall & Wollersheim, 1979). 
Indirect support for overestimation of threat models has been derived from studies 
showing that compared with controls, individuals with OCD have a history of 
parental overprotection (Frost, Steketee, Cohn & Griess, 1994), engage in less 
risk-taking behaviour (e.g., Steiner, 1972) and readily identify themes of danger in 
everyday situations (Menzies, Harris, Cumming & Einstein, 2000). Despite the 
strong theoretical support for the model, few empirical studies have examined the 
role of exaggerated threat estimations in OCD (Steketee et al., 1998), and fewer 
still have investigated these beliefs in obsessive-compulsive checking. 
Nevertheless, a study by Overton and Menzies (2002) provided support for a 
primary role of danger expectancies in a sample of OCD checkers. Ratings of 
perceived probability and cost of danger, thought-action fusion, confidence in 
memory, intolerance to uncertainty and need to control thoughts in relation to 
their most prominent individual checking concerns were compared between 21 
OCD checkers and 21 control participants. While there were no significant 
differences between the groups with regard to perceived personal responsibility, 
thought-action fusion and confidence in memory, OCD checking participants 
endorsed significantly higher ratings of probability and cost of danger, intolerance 
of uncertainty and need to control thoughts compared to controls. 
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Despite these positive findings, models emphasising a crucial role of exaggerated 
threat appraisal in OCD have been criticised on the basis that they may not 
adequately distinguish the disorder from other anxiety conditions (e.g., Rheaume, 
Ladouceur, Freeston & Letarte, 1995). As a consequence, several researchers 
have proposed that beliefs relating to perceived responsibility may have a more 
pivotal role in obsessive-compulsive checking. 
Inflated Personal Responsibility 
Rachman (1976) observed that most checking rituals occur predominantly in the 
individual's home, are carried out when the person is alone and intensify when the 
person is depressed or feels responsible for the act concerned. On the basis of 
these observations, Rachman (1976) suggested that the intensity of obsessive-
compulsive behaviours might be reduced if responsibility for aversive outcomes 
was lessened. 
Subsequently, Salkovskis (1985, 1989) inspired by Beck's cognitive model of 
depression (Beck, Epstein & Harrison, 1983), proposed that obsessions are 
intrusive cognitions that elicit 'negative automatic thoughts' about personal 
responsibility. The negative automatic thoughts in turn are believed to trigger 
compulsions or rituals to neutralise the associated discomfort and perceived 
harmful consequences that result from the negative appraisal process. As a result 
of this neutralising, intrusive cognitions become more salient and frequent and 
elicit greater discomfort, thereby increasing the likelihood of further neutralising 
attempts or compulsions (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989). 
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Numerous researchers have provided support for the mediating role of 
responsibility in obsessive-compulsive checking. For example, Rachman (1993) 
reported that compulsive checkers do not display obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
when first admitted to hospital, presumably due to not feeling responsible for the 
foreign environment. Additionally, pilot cognitive treatments targeting the 
correction of inflated responsibility beliefs have been successful in producing 
significant symptom relief in OCD checking (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 1996). 
Experimental research has also supported a role for inflated personal 
responsibility in obsessive-compulsive checking. Lopakta and Rachman (1995) 
compared ratings of perceived responsibility, discomfort, urge to check, 
probability and severity of anticipated harm, estimated length of time to complete 
checking, perceived panic, and likelihood, timing and severity of perceived 
criticism in 30 OCD checkers across four individually tailored behavioural 
avoidance tests: high responsibility, low responsibility, control check and control 
clean. Relative to the control groups, the high and low groups reported 
significantly higher and lower ratings of responsibility respectively, indicating the 
manipulation was successful. Additionally, the low responsibility group reported 
significantly lower discomfort, urge to check, length of time needed to check and 
probability of harm than the control group. 
Lopakta and Rachman (1995) concluded that experimentally decreasing perceived 
responsibility leads to significant reductions in discomfort and urges to carry out 
compulsive checking. However, it should be noted that increasing responsibility 
did not alter these ratings in the high group. 
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Foa, Sacks, Tolin, Prezworski and Amir (2002) compared ratings of urge to 
rectify situations, anticipated relief and perceived responsibility from the 
Obsessive Compulsive Responsibility Scale (OCRS) (Foa, Amir, Bogert, Molnar 
& Przeworski, 2001) among 22 OCD checkers, 24 OCD noncheckers and 25 non-
anxious controls. The OCD checkers reported significantly greater urges to 
rectify situations, relief upon rectifying situations and perceived responsibility for 
low and moderate risk scenarios compared to the control group. Additionally, 
OCD checkers, but not noncheckers, rated their urge to rectify and relief 
significantly higher than controls for the low and moderate risk items, and 
responsibility significantly higher for the moderate risk category. Foa et al. 
(2002) believed these results supported Rachman's (1993) proposal that 
responsibility concerns are more strongly associated with checking compared with 
other compulsions. 
Not all research supports the inflated personal responsibility hypothesis of OCD 
however. Emmelkamp and Aardema (1999) reported that inflated responsibility 
did not account for the variance in obsessive-compulsive behaviour in many of the 
Padua Inventory-Revised (van Oppen, Hoekstra & Emmelkamp, 1995) subscales. 
Additionally, Wells (1997) suggested that responsibility appraisal is an emergent 
property of meta-cognitive processing and a marker for dysfunctional beliefs 
about the danger and influences of thought that are more central to OCD. 
A similar conclusion was reached by Menzies et al. (2000) in a study that 
manipulated responsibility on a questionnaire requiring participants to rate the 
likelihood and severity of potential outcomes of checking and washing situations 
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on 100-point visual analogue scales. Increasing perceptions of personal 
responsibility in healthy participants led to an increase in subjective cost and 
severity of danger ratings. Menzies et al. (2000) concluded that, while 
responsibility concerns do play a role in OCD, they operate through an indirect 
effect on danger estimates. 
Intolerance for Uncertainty 
In contrast to models proposing exaggerated threat appraisal or inflated personal 
responsibility, several researchers have observed that intolerance for uncertainty 
and indecision are the defining cognitive features of OCD (Steketee et al., 1998). 
Beech and Liddell (1974; as cited in Steketee et al., 1998) proposed that ritualistic 
behaviours, such as checking, are maintained to address the need for certainty 
before terminating an activity, in addition to reducing immediate discomfort. 
Initial support for the intolerance for uncertainty hypothesis came from studies 
indicating that individuals with OCD are more cautious, take longer to categorise 
objects, and more frequently request information to be repeated than nonclinical 
groups (e.g., Frost, Lahart, Dugas & Sher, 1988). Empirical studies have 
subsequently provided further support for the intolerance to uncertainty 
hypothesis. 
Steketee et al. (1998) compared 62 mixed OCD individuals, 45 other anxiety 
disorder patients and 34 matched controls on the 90-item Obsessive Compulsive 
Beliefs Questionnaire that measures the strength of beliefs of responsibility for 
harm, need to control thoughts, intolerance for uncertainty, overestimation of 
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threat, discomfort/anxiety and coping. The OCD group had significantly higher 
scores on all belief domains compared with the other groups. The anxiety 
disorder group also reported significantly higher ratings than controls for 
intolerance for uncertainty, intolerance for anxiety and beliefs about coping 
suggesting that these features are not specific to OCD, but characterize anxiety 
disorders in general. However, regression analyses on the collapsed data of both 
clinical groups found that when anxiety belief items were held constant, only 
intolerance for uncertainty explained the variance among OCD symptom scores. 
In contrast, Mancini, D'Olimpio, Del Genio, Didonna and Prunetti (2002) 
reported that intolerance for uncertainty could not be considered a strong predictor 
of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Intolerance for uncertainty (defined as "need 
for cognitive closure") was investigated in a principal components analysis of 
Depression, Anxiety, OCD symptoms and Need for Cognitive Closure subscales 
in a sample of 144 community volunteers. Although a three-factor solution 
emerged, interpreted as representing "general distress", "need for closure", and 
"obsessions and compulsions", a series of hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses showed that the need for cognitive closure was not a strong predictor of 
obsessions or compulsions as measured by the Padua Inventory — Revised (van 
Oppen et al., 1995). Mancini et al. (2002) concluded that intolerance for 
uncertainty therefore does not have a central role in OCD but appears to subserve 
other specific meta-cognitive beliefs. 
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Summary 
A large number of cognitive variables have been suggested as being important in 
the development and maintenance of OCD. Exaggerated threat appraisal, inflated 
personal responsibility and intolerance for uncertainty appear to be among the 
more robust findings obtained to date. However, considerable disagreement exists 
in the literature as to the relative importance of these cognitive factors in the 
maintenance of obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Purdon & Clark, 1994). 
Further, the theoretical and experimental literature, whilst consistently identifying 
these cognitive variables, has not been able to integrate them into a meaningful 
model of checking behaviour. This may be largely due to the absence of well-
controlled empirical studies. 
Additionally, despite the strong evidence in favour of at least partially distinct 
aetiologies between the various OCD subtypes (e.g., Matsunaga et al., 2001; 
Overton & Menzies, 2002; Phillips et al., 2000; Wilson, 1998), few studies have 
directly examined these cognitive variables solely in relation to obsessive-
compulsive checking. Therefore, while it seems likely that inflated personal 
responsibility, exaggerated threat appraisal and intolerance for uncertainty all play 
a significant role in obsessive-compulsive checking, only tentative conclusions 
can be made at this time with regard to whether these variables distinguish 
checking from other OCD subtypes. 
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Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
Substantial progress regarding the likely causes of obsessive-compulsive checking 
has been made over the last few decades. In particular, there is growing evidence 
suggesting that cognitive and memory factors play a critical role in the aetiology 
of OCD. 
With regard to memory processes, although visual deficits have been reported 
reasonably consistently, recent findings suggest impairments in memory for 
actions or reality monitoring and reduced confidence in memory may be more 
important in obsessive-compulsive checking. Such findings are in line with 
neurobiological accounts of OCD, proposing a role of dysfunctional frontostriatal 
and basal ganglia networks (Tallis, 1997). 
However, memory deficit theories predict impairment across a broad range of 
memory functions, whereas the checking behaviours evident in OCD are highly 
circumscribed (Summerfeldt & Endler, 1998). Further, few studies have found 
correlations between the observed memory impairments and OCD symptom 
severity. A causal relationship cannot therefore be implied. Additionally, whilst 
checkers have been shown to be impaired relative to non-checking controls on 
standardised memory batteries, the memory impairments have rarely fallen 
outside the 'normal' range (e.g. Sher et al., 1984). 
Metacognitive factors are therefore also likely to be important in obsessive-
compulsive checking (Tallis, 1997). In particular, there is increasing support for a 
role for exaggerated threat appraisal, inflated personal responsibility and 
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intolerance for uncertainty in the literature. However, the exact mechanisms by 
which these cognitive variables exert their effects on memory processes, and 
ultimately checking behaviour, are far from clear. 
Therefore, despite the insights research into cognitive and memory processes has 
afforded in recent years, a successful integration of the findings has not yet been 
accomplished (Wilson, 1998). An inability to consistently replicate findings 
across studies has been cited as the major impediment to a more complete 
understanding of OCD. Methodological flaws associated with the various 
investigations into obsessive-compulsive checking are partially to blame. 
The OCCWG (1997) concluded that heterogeneity in the content of obsessional 
concerns (i.e., mixed symptom profiles) has been the chief impediment in research 
into the cognitive biases of OCD. Similar concerns have plagued the 
neurobiological and neuropsychological 'research. As previously discussed, there 
is an emerging literature suggesting that the different subtypes of OCD may have 
at least partially distinct aetiologies (e.g., Minichiello et al., 1990; Overton & 
Menzies, 2002; Phillips et al., 2000; Wilson, 1998). Investigations carefully 
examining differences between the OCD subtypes would therefore be beneficial 
in elucidating the common and subtype-specific developmental factors, neural 
circuits and cognitive and memory dysfunctions involved in OCD. 
Methodological constraints associated with studying a clinical population have 
also contributed to the lack of understanding regarding the cognitive factors and 
memory phenomena underlying obsessive-compulsive checking (Salkovskis & 
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Harrison, 1984). In addition to small sample sizes, many studies failed to screen 
for, or assess the impact of, anxiety, depression and other comorbid disorders, and 
medication or treatment status among their samples of OCD checkers. Further, 
very few studies included psychiatric controls, making interpretations regarding 
the specificity of findings to obsessive-compulsive checking tenuous. 
It is conceivable that the memory deficits and cognitive variables observed in 
obsessive-compulsive checking are merely a function of anxiety or depression and 
may therefore be common to a number of disorders. The inclusion of individuals 
with anxiety disorders other than OCD who have similarly high levels of anxiety 
and depression, is a potential solution to this problem (Dar et al., 2000). 
Alternatively, statistical methods may assist in determining whether memory 
impairments and cognitive biases remain once the influence of anxiety and 
depression are eliminated. 
The use of both clinical and nonclinical checking samples has been frequently 
cited in the literature as limiting progress in understanding the development of 
checking behaviours. Several researchers have questioned the generalisability of 
results obtained from arbitrarily assigned subclinical analogues with varying 
levels of symptom severity to the psychopathology underlying OCD (e.g., 
Simonds & Elliot, 2001; Tallis et al., 1999). The stability of symptoms in 
subclinical samples has also been questioned. However, similar clinical and 
personality profiles have been found among participants with a wide range of 
scores above the mean on OCD symptom inventories (e.g., Mataix-Cols et al., 
2000). Support for long-term symptom stability has also been reported (e.g., 
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Burns et al., 1995; Morris et al., 2000). Nevertheless, it would be prudent for 
future investigations using subclinical and clinical samples to consistently employ 
the same stringent selection criteria, with discrete and narrowly defined symptom 
levels that assess for the presence of OCD and examine the duration of symptoms. 
Finally, providing standardised, ecologically valid stimuli has proven to be a 
barrier to developing a more complete understanding of obsessive-compulsive 
checking. Research investigating memory processes in OCD has generally relied 
on extrapolating the results obtained from highly structured memory batteries, 
simple laboratory performance tasks, or recall of verbal stimuli that are not 
directly related to checking (Woods et al., 2002). Similar criticisms can be 
applied to the stimuli used in the cognitive biases research. As previously 
discussed, checking behaviours are most likely to be elicited when an individual 
feels personally responsible (or perhaps some other cognitive variable) and 
presumes that a poor outcome may result from an incompetent performance (Sher 
et al., 1984; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993). 
It is therefore highly possible that the emotionally neutral and non-specific 
experimental materials used in many of the investigations examined in this review 
may not have been sufficiently realistic to induce the necessary anxiety needed to 
elicit the cognitive distortions or memory dysfunctions maintaining OCD (Woods 
et al., 2002). Individuals with OCD may show greater impairments in more 
realistic situations compared with the simple performance tasks in the laboratory 
(McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993). A suitable experimental paradigm for eliciting 
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checking behaviour in the laboratory is therefore a worthwhile goal for future 
research. 
In conclusion, despite the methodological flaws of many of the studies in this 
field, there appears to be a convergence of findings suggesting both cognitive and 
memory dysfunction may be important in obsessive-compulsive checking. More 
specifically, poorer memory for self-performed actions and reduced confidence in 
memory, in addition to dysfunctional appraisals concerning personal 
responsibility and threat estimation are likely to be involved. However, further 
replication of the results is clearly needed. Additionally, research examining both 
cognitive and memory factors in obsessive-compulsive checking with ecologically 
valid stimuli is required as such findings have important implications for the 
revision of current models of OCD. 
The development of a theoretical framework of obsessive-compulsive checking 
that accounts for these variables and explains the relationships between them 
would allow for the development of more effective treatment techniques. For 
example, cognitive techniques designed to enhance visual memory or memory for 
actions through the use of more efficient encoding and retrieval strategies or to 
correct dysfunctional appraisal processes may be effective in the treatment of the 
disorder (Dirson et al., 1995; McFall & Wollersheim, 1979; Savage et al., 2000; 
Woods et al., 2002; Zitterl et al., 2001). Pilot treatments along these lines have 
already shown some promise (e.g., Jones & Menzies, 1997). 
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Finally, future research investigating the cognitive and memory factors underlying 
obsessive-compulsive checking may provide further evidence for aetiological 
differences between subtypes. Clearly, this would have important implications for 
the present DSM-IV (APA, 1994) classification that considers the heterogenous 
subtypes of OCD to be variants of a single, Axis I Anxiety Disorder. 
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Abstract 
Few studies have examined the cognitive and memory deficits proposed to 
underlie obsessive-compulsive checking using ecologically valid stimuli. This 
issue was addressed by obtaining ratings of perceived responsibility, likelihood 
and cost of danger, intolerance for uncertainty and memory accuracy, confidence 
and certainty in relation to video clips depicting typical checking activities from 
25 Low and 24 High non-clinical checking participants. Despite equivalent 
auditory and spatial working memory performance, High checkers were 
significantly less accurate on the checking task. This was not attributable to 
higher levels of anxiety or depression. High checkers also rated the cost of 
danger as being significantly greater despite identifying similar aversive 
outcomes and probability ratings and reported significantly higher levels of 
personal responsibility and intolerance for uncertainty. However, anxiety and 
depression moderated these differences. These findings have important 
implications for models of obsessive-compulsive checking. It is suggested that 
cognitive appraisals, such as high severity of danger estimates, may interfere with 
the processing of threat information, resulting in the observed memory for actions 
deficit in obsessive-compulsive checking. The use of salient checking stimuli in 
future research will provide a more valid method for examining such processes. 
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Despite being first recognised as a disorder in the psychiatric literature as early as 
1838 (Jenike, 1995), and extensively researched since that time, the aetiological 
determinants of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) are not fully understood. 
Diverse areas of research including neurobiological (for reviews see Micallef & 
Blin, 2001; Saxena, Brody, Schwarzt & Baxter, 1998), genetic (e.g., Heteema, 
Neale & Kendle, 2001; Pato, Pato & PauIs, 2002; Thomsen, 1997) and 
neuropsychological studies (for reviews see Cox, 1997; Greisberg & McKay, 
2003; Tallis, 1997; Wilson, 1998), have made significant contributions in 
furthering our understanding of the disorder. However, models exploring 
cognitive factors and impaired memory functioning have perhaps shown the most 
promise in explaining the development and maintenance of obsessive-compulsive 
checking to date. 
Carr (1974) is credited with developing the first cognitive model of OCD, 
postulating that individuals make abnormally high subjective estimates of both the 
probability and "cost" of aversive outcomes related to having an obsession. 
Compulsive behaviours were proposed to develop as threat-reducing activities 
that acted to lower the probability and/or cost of the unfavourable outcome. 
McFall and Wollersheim (1979) extended on this model suggesting that the 
overestimation of threat arose from a combination of irrational beliefs and 
underestimation of available coping resources. They proposed that this appraisal 
process led to feelings of loss of control, uncertainty and anxiety that in turn 
triggered the obsessions and compulsions that distinguish the disorder (McFall & 
Wollersheim, 1979). More recently, the cognitive model of obsessional thinking 
has been conceptualised as an equation, specifying that anxiety arises due to the 
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multiplicative effects of perceived probability and cost of threat, divided by 
perceived ability to cope and perceived 'rescue' factors (Beck, Emery & 
Greenberg, 1985; Salkovslcis, Forrester & Richards, 1998). 
Investigations in both clinical and non-clinical samples conducted by Menzies and 
colleagues have provided support for the mediating role of expectations of 
potential threat in the aetiology of OCD. For example, Jones and Menzies (1997) 
found large and significant relationships between danger expectancies and 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms but not for other cognitive mediators in 
obsessive-compulsive washers. Similarly, a study comparing the role of potential 
cognitive mediators in a sample of obsessive-compulsive checkers and matched 
non-clinical controls provided further evidence for the role of beliefs concerning 
the probability and severity of harm in OCD (Overton & Menzies, 2002). 
However, cognitive models emphasising dysfunctional danger appraisal processes 
in OCD have been criticised for being unable to adequately distinguish 
individuals with OCD from other clinical groups (Obsessive-Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG), 1997). That is, overestimation of the 
likelihood and severity of harm appears to be common to many anxiety disorders 
(Salkovslcis, 1985). Consequently, some researchers have suggested that beliefs 
concerning personal responsibility may play a more central role in the aetiology 
and maintenance of OCD. 
Salkovskis' (1985, 1989) influential model proposed that obsessions elicit 
'negative automatic thoughts' concerning personal responsibility that in turn 
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trigger compulsions or rituals to neutralise the associated discomfort and 
perceived harmful consequences. Numerous researchers have provided support 
for this model. Rachman (1993) reported that compulsive checkers do not display 
symptoms when first admitted to hospital, presumably due to the foreign 
environment not providing salient triggers for responsibility concerns. Further, 
experimentally manipulating perceived responsibility has produced corresponding 
changes in discomfort and urge to carry out compulsive checking in several 
studies (e.g., Foa, Sacks, Tolin, Prezworski & Amir, 2002; Lopakta & Rachman, 
1995; Rheume, Ladoucer, Freeston & Letarte, 1995). Finally, clinically 
significant reductions in obsessive-compulsive checking symptoms and perceived 
responsibility that were maintained at 6- and 12-month follow-up have been 
reported following a treatment specifically targeting inflated responsibility 
(Ladoucer, Leger, Rheaume, & Dube, 1996). 
Although a role for inflated personal responsibility in OCD is well supported in 
the literature, not all research is in favour of it being the central cognitive 
mediator underlying OCD. For example, Emmelkamp and Aardema (1999) found 
that ratings of inflated personal responsibility did not account for variance in 
scores of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Additionally, some researchers have 
found evidence to suggest that inflated personal responsibility operates indirectly 
through danger expectancies (Menzies, Harris, Cumming & Einstein, 2000; 
Wells, 1997). 
In addition to cognitions concerning exaggerated threat appraisal and inflated 
personal responsibility, some support is emerging in favour of a role for 
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intolerance for uncertainty in OCD. Steketee, Frost and Cohen (1998) reported 
that of several cognitive variables, including threat estimation, intolerance for 
uncertainty alone explained the variance among OCD symptom scores once 
anxiety beliefs were held constant. However, Mancini, D'Olimpio, Del Genio, 
Didonna and Prunetti (2002) reported conflicting results. In a series of 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses, which incorporated depression and 
anxiety level, the researchers did not find strong evidence for a significant 
relationship between measures of intolerance for uncertainty and checking 
symptoms. It was concluded that intolerance for uncertainty appears to subserve 
more specific meta-cognitions, rather than having a central role in OCD. 
A number of diverse memory phenomena have been suggested as being 
aetiologically important in both the development and maintenance of obsessive-
compulsive behaviours and may explain some of the anomalies reported in the 
cognitive literature. Sher, Frost and Otto (1983) hypothesised that compulsive 
checkers are characterised by poorer memory for actions and deficits in 'reality 
monitoring', the ability to determine real from imagined events, compared with 
their peers. 
Sher, Mann and Frost (1984) found evidence for impaired memory for actions and 
reality monitoring in non-clinical checkers in an experiment involving the 
participants' recollection of cognitive tasks performed. A number of researchers 
have replicated these findings in both clinical and non-clinical samples (e.g., 
Ecker & Engelkamp, 1995; Rubenstein, Peynircioglu, Chambless, & Pigott, 1993; 
Tallis, Pratt & Jamani, 1999; Zitterl, Urban, Linzmayer, Aigner, Demal, Semler, 
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et al., 2001). Additionally Sher, Frost, Kushner, Crews and Alexander (1989) 
reported that the frequency of checking behaviour was negatively related to 
memory functioning in a clinical sample. However, although impaired memory 
for actions appears to be the most consistently demonstrated deficit in the 
literature (see Tallis, 1997 for a review), several studies have failed to support 
these findings. 
McNally and Kohlbeck (1993) found no evidence of deficits in memory or reality 
monitoring ability, but reduced confidence in memory for actions, iri a sample of 
obsessive-compulsive checkers compared with control participants. As a result of 
these findings, it was proposed that the memory dysfunction in OCD might arise 
from poorer confidence in memory rather than an actual memory deficit. This 
hypothesis has received support from a number of researchers (e.g., Constans, 
Foa, Franklin & Mathews, 1995; Dar, Rish, Hermesh, Taub & Fux, 2000; 
MacDonald, Antony, MacLeod & Richter, 1997; Merckelbach & Wessel, 2000; 
Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, Amir, Street & Foa, 2001; van den Hout & Kindt, 
2003; Zitterl et al., 2001). 
Clearly, a diverse array of cognitive and memory factors have been proposed to 
underlie OCD. However it is also apparent that researchers are yet to reach 
agreement as to the relative contributions of each of the proposed factors, or the 
mechanisms by which they interact. The lack of understanding concerning the 
processes contributing to OCD may be partly attributable to methodological 
constraints associated with providing salient stimuli in a laboratory setting 
(Woods, Vevea, Chambless & Bayen, 2002). 
59 
Previous research has also been criticised for failing to control for, or assess the 
influence of, anxiety, depression and other psychological conditions on the 
performance of memory tasks or in relation to cognitive appraisals for obsessive-
compulsive checking. It is possible then, that the poorer memory performance 
and confidence documented for individuals with OCD, or differences in cognitive 
appraisal processes, may be attributable to more general effects of emotional state. 
Many studies investigating cognitive and memory processes in OCD have used 
self-report or belief measures, recall of verbally presented material, or general 
neuropsychological batteries in the absence of ecologically valid checking stimuli. 
It is likely that such measures may not be sufficient to engage the cognitive and 
memory processes thought to underlie OCD (Woods et al., 2002). Frost, Sher and 
Geen (1986) suggest that attempts to construct laboratory simulations of checking 
behaviour should draw on predominant life activities that involve some important 
personal consequence. 
This study aims to further the research into cognitive and memory processes 
among individuals engaging in high levels of checking behaviour. 
Methodological issues associated with inappropriate stimuli used in other studies 
will be addressed by providing video footage of an individual engaging with 
salient obsessive-compulsive checking stimuli such as electrical appliances, door 
and car locks and taps. The potential influence of anxiety and depression will also 
be addressed through statistical analyses. 
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In order to measure accuracy of recall, High and Low checking undergraduate 
participants will be required to indicate whether the stimulus presented in each of 
the scenarios was either OFF (the stimulus is clearly shown to be turned off or 
locked), ON (the stimulus is clearly left on or unlocked) or UNSEEN (it is not 
clear whether the stimulus is turned off/locked or on/unlocked). This last 
condition is designed to differentiate between false reporting or guessing and 
inaccurate recall and to determine the extent to which ambiguity (intolerance for 
uncertainty) affects memory. For each stimulus, the participants will also be 
required to rate the probability and likelihood of aversive outcomes, personal 
responsibility and desire to check and discomfort associated with not checking 
(intolerance for uncertainty) in relation to each of the scenarios. Additionally, 
participants will be asked to provide ratings of memory certainty and confidence 
for each of the scenes and complete assessments of their general intellectual 
ability and working and spatial memory. 
In line with research suggesting a central role of threat appraisal in OCD, it is 
predicted that High checking participants will report greater overall likelihood and 
cost of danger ratings relative to low checking participants. High checking 
participants are also expected to report greater overall personal responsibility and 
intolerance for uncertainty compared with low checking participants. With regard 
to memory processes, it is hypothesised that high checking participants will have 
poorer memory for actions and report lower confidence and certainty in memory 
compared with low checking students. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from a pool of undergraduate Psychology 1 students 
from the University of Tasmania who were screened for subclinical obsessive-
compulsive checking symptoms as measured by the Padua Inventory — Revised 
(PI-R) (Burns, Keortge, Formea & Sternberger, 1996). From this sample, 334 
questionnaires were returned, of which 315 were correctly completed. Students 
scoring the highest and lowest Checking subscale scores were invited to 
participate in the study. 
Following exclusion of participants reporting current, untreated psychological 
conditions, 24 High (mean score = 17.67, SD = 4.59; range = 13-29) and 25 Low 
(mean = 1.00, SD = 1.08; range = 0-2) scoring students completed the study. The 
High checking group consisted of six males and 18 females with a mean age of 
20.00 years (SD=2.93) and the Low group was comprised of six males and 19 
females with a mean age of 22.52 years (SD=6.27). A one-way between groups 
ANOVA indicated the groups did not differ in terms of age. 
Materials 
Participants were assessed with the following measures: 
Padua Inventory-Revised (PI-R) (Bums et al., 1996). This 39-item self-
report measure of obsessive and compulsive symptoms provides scores on five 
main factors: impulses, washing, checking, rumination and precision. Items are 
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rated on a five-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). The Checking 
subscale is comprised of ten items, with a maximum possible score of 40. The 
inventory is reported to have adequate reliability and validity and distinguishes 
between obsessions and worry (Burns et al., 1996). 
Beck Depression Inventory - II (BDI -II) (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). 
This 21-item self-report inventory measures the severity of cognitive, affective, 
somatic and motoric symptoms of depression. The items are rated on a four-point 
scale from 0 (symptom-free) to 3 (high symptom level) over the past two weeks 
with a maximum total score of 63. A score of 26 or above indicates severe 
depression (Beck et al., 1996). The BDI is the most widely used assessment 
instrument for depression in clinical and normal populations and has been shown 
to have good psychometric properties (e.g., Dozois, Dobson & Ahnberg, 1998; 
Steer & Clark, 1997; Whisman, Perez & Ramel, 2000). 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck & Steer, 1990). This 21-item self-
report inventory measures the degree and level of discomfort of common 
physiological and cognitive symptoms of anxiety. Items are rated on a four-point 
scale from 0 ("not at all") to 3 ("severely") over the past week with a total 
maximum score of 63. A score of 30 or above indicates severe anxiety. The BAT 
has been established as being a reliable and valid measure of anxiety that has good 
psychometric properties (Creamer, Foran & Bell, 1995; Fydrich, Dowdall & 
Chambless, 1992). 
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National Adult Reading Test (NART) (Nelson, 1982). This test comprises 
a list of 50 irregular increasingly difficult words that the participant is required to 
read aloud. Since verbal ability correlates highly with intellectual ability, the 
NART is widely used as a screening measure of pre-morbid intellectual 
functioning (Lezak, 1995). Numerous studies have provided support for the 
factor-structure and predictive ability of this measure (e.g., Bright, Jaldow & 
Kopelman, 2002; Crawford, Deary, Starr & Whalley, 2001). 
Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale —III (WAIS-III) (Weschler, 1997a) — 
Digit Span subtest. The Digit Span subtest of the WAIS-III is designed to provide 
an indication of short-term auditory memory, including working memory and 
attention. Psychometric research supports the reliability and validity of this 
subtest (The Psychological Corporation, 1997). 
Weschler Memory Scale — Third Edition (WMS-III) (Weschler, 1997b) — 
Spatial Span subtest. This subtest is designed to assess immediate visual memory 
for spatial sequences and has been used in psychological research to provide a 
measure of memory for actions. The reliability and validity of this subtest is well-
supported (The Psychological Corporation, 1997). 
Checking Program (Appendix A). A series of video clips of between 5-12 
seconds duration relating to common obsessive-compulsive checking stimuli such 
as doors, appliances and taps were presented individually to participants on a PC, 
with questions relating to the proposed cognitive and memory factors following 
each stimulus presentation. Two sets of 15 video clips were created in order to 
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control for potential differences among the stimuli. Set 1 consisted of scenes 
depicting a person closing a car door, closing a front door, and turning off a 
kitchen tap, heater and stove. The stimuli in Set 2 were matched to those of Set 1 
and consisted of scenes showing a person closing a car boot, closing a back door, 
and turning off a bathroom tap, iron and oven. 
There were three conditions for each scene: 1) OFF: the stimulus was clearly 
turned off or locked, 2) UNSEEN: an ambiguous condition that did not indicate 
whether the stimulus had been turned off or locked, and 3) ON: the stimulus was 
clearly left on or unlocked. The sequence of presentations for each stimulus 
condition within each set was randomised to control for ordering effects. 
Participants within the High and Low Checking groups were randomly allocated 
to either Set 1 or 2. 
Cognitive Mediators and Memory Questions consisted of nine questions 
designed to elicit some of the cognitive and memory factors proposed to underlie 
checking behaviour. These questions were presented in random order after each 
stimulus presentation. 
The participants were instructed to watch each video scene carefully and then 
answer the questions that followed as accurately as possible. For the cognitive 
mediators questions, participants were instructed to imagine that they were the 
person in the film clip and to rate their responses accordingly. The responses to 
each question were automatically recorded in an individual data file (Appendix 
A). 
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Table 1 presents these questions and the range of participant response allowed. 
Table 1. Proposed cognitive mediators and memory phenomena in obsessive-
compulsive checking and the corresponding checking program questions.  
Cognitive Mediators and Memory Questions 
Memory 
Accuracy 
Discomfort 
(Intolerance for 
Uncertainty) 
Cost and 
Probability of 
Danger 
Personal 
Responsibility 
Memory 
Certainty 
Confidence in 
memory 
Desire to check 
(Intolerance for 
Uncertainty) 
1. Was the (stimulus) Off, On, Unsure? 
2. How uncomfortable would you feel if you were not sure the 
(stimulus) was off/locked? (0 "fine" — 100 "completely 
uncomfortable")? 
3a. What is the worst thing that could happen as a result of not 
checking? (Open Question) 
3b. How bad would that be? (0 "not bad" — 100 "unbearable")? 
3c. What is the probability of that happening? (%) 
3d. How personally responsible would you feel if (worst event) 
happened? (0 "not at all"-100 "totally") 
4. How certain are you that the (stimulus) was locked/off? 
(0 "not at all"-100 "totally") 
5. How confident are you that your memory is correct? (0 "not 
at all"-100 "totally") 
6. How much would you like to be able to check? (0 "not at 
all" — 100 "totally") 
Procedure 
This research was conducted in the School of Psychology, University of Tasmania 
following ethical approval from the University of Tasmania Human Ethics 
Committee. Participants selected for inclusion in the study were provided with an 
information sheet outlining the nature and aims of the research (Appendix B 1). 
Informed consent (Appendix B2) and demographic data (Appendix B3) were then 
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obtained. Participants then completed the NART, WAIS-III Digit Span subtest, 
BDI-H and BAI. 
Following these assessments, participants completed the computerised checking 
task. Finally, participants completed the WMS — III Spatial Span subtest and 
were debriefed (see Appendix C for screening data). 
Design and Data Analysis 
This investigation employed two designs. The first, a 2(Checking level: High, 
Low) x 3(Condition: ON, OFF, UNSEEN) mixed design, investigated differences 
between the High and Low checking groups with regard to the memory processes 
examined (Memory Accuracy, Memory Certainty and Memory Confidence 
ratings). The between groups variable was checking level (Low, High), the within 
groups variable was Condition (ON, OFF, UNSEEN) and the dependent variables 
were the mean number of stimuli correctly recalled (memory accuracy), memory 
certainty and confidence ratings. 
The second 2(Checking level) x 3(Condition) mixed design investigated 
differences between the two groups with regard to each of the five cognitive 
mediators (Discomfort, Probability of Danger, Cost of Danger, Personal 
Responsibility, Desire to Check). The between group variable was again 
checking level (Low, High), the within groups variable was Condition (ON, OFF, 
UNSEEN), and the dependent variables were the mean scores on the cognitive 
mediators questions. 
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A significance level of p<.05 was used for all analyses. One-way between groups 
ANOVAs were used to examine differences between the groups with regard to the 
NART, Digit Span, Spatial Span, BAT, BDI-II, PI-R Total and PI-R Checking 
scores. To assess comparability between set 1 and set 2 of the checking program 
for each cognitive and memory variable, separate 2(Set) x 3(Condition) mixed 
ANOVAs were employed. Differences between the two groups for each cognitive 
and memory factor were assessed by separate 2(Group) x 3(Condition) mixed 
ANOVAs. Newman-Keuls post hoc tests were used to further examine significant 
differences where appropriate. Where significant group differences were found, 
ANCOVAs with BDI-II and BAI scores as covariates were performed in order to 
control for the potential influence of mood state on the cognitive and memory 
measures (see Appendix DI for all analyses). 
Results 
Demographic Data 
The results of the screening measures for each group are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for participant screening 
measures. 
N PI-R 
Total 
PI-R 
Checking 
NART DS SS BAT BDI 
Low 
High 
25 
24 
6.92 
(4.92) 
42.63 
(13.39) 
'1.00 
(1.08) 
17.67 
(4.59) 
33.68 
(5.59) 
33.46 
(5.11) 
10.64 
(2.33) 
10.75 
(2.91) 
10.72 
(2.51) 
11.08 
(2.73) 
4.12 
(5.19) 
7.96 
(4.49) 
4.96 
(4.65) 
10.08 
(6.83) 
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It is clear that the groups were very similar in terms of estimated intellectual 
ability, working memory and memory for actions, but differed on the measures of 
anxiety, depression, and as selected, checking behaviour. A manipulation check 
by means of a one-way between groups ANOVA, confirmed that the High group 
reported significantly higher levels of checking behaviour, as assessed by the PI-R 
Checking subscale, compared with the Low checking group, F(1, 47) = 311.42, 
p<.01. Burns et al. (1996) reported means of 7.48 and 19.87 for a normative 
sample and OCD group respectively. The High checking group in this study are 
clearly just below the threshold for the OCD group in the Burns et al. (1996) study 
and therefore engage in considerably more checking behaviour than their peers. 
A one-way between groups ANOVA revealed that the High group also reported 
significantly higher levels of overall obsessive-compulsive symptoms compared 
with the Low group, F(1, 47) = 155.86, p<.01. Reference to the normative data 
indicates that a mean of 21.78 is typical for the normal population compared to 
54.93 for an OCD group. This finding suggests then, that the High checking 
group also experience relatively high levels of other obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms such as contamination concerns and ordering rituals compared with 
their peers. However, it should be noted that the Low group in the present study 
reported far lower overall obsessive-compulsive symptoms compared with the 
normative sample, thereby magnifying the difference between the Low and High 
groups. 
As predicted, one-way between group ANOVAs indicated there were no 
significant differences between the Low and High Checking groups with regard to 
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estimated intellectual ability (NART score), working memory (Digit Span) or 
memory for actions (Spatial Span). Participants fell within the average range on 
the measures of working memory and memory for actions, whilst the mean NART 
scores predicted a 'High Average' intelligence level (WAIS-III Full Scale IQ = 
114) for both groups (see Nelson, 1982). 
However, as can be seen in Table 2, the High group reported significantly higher 
levels of anxiety (BAT score), F(1, 47) = 7.64, p<.01 and depression (BDI-II 
score), F(1,47) = 9.48, p<.01 than the Low group. Reference to the normative 
data for these instruments indicated the Low group fell within the "normal" range 
for both anxiety and depression. The High group was also placed in the "normal" 
range for anxiety but fell within the "mild" range for depression. This finding 
was not unexpected given the common finding of greater levels of depression 
among individuals with OCD (Sasson, Zohar, Chopra, Lustig, Iancu & Hendler, 
1997). 
Manipulation Check for Set 
In order to ascertain the comparability of Set 1 and Set 2 of the Checking 
Program, 2(Set) x 3(Condition) mixed ANOVAs were conducted on the data for 
all memory and cognitive mediator questions. The analyses revealed that there 
were no significant differences between the sets or significant Set by Condition 
interactions for the measures of Cost and Probability of Danger, Desire to Check, 
Personal Responsibility, Memory Certainty and Memory Confidence. Hence, the 
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data from each set were collapsed for the analyses of group differences for these 
measures. 
Analyses of the mean Number of Correct Responses (memory accuracy) data 
found a significant Set by Condition interaction, F(2,94) = 3.81, p<.05, a 
significant main effect of Condition, F(2,94) = 62.66, p<.01, and a trend for a 
significant main effect of Set, F(1,47 ) = 3.79, p=.06. As shown in Figure 1 and 
confirmed by post hoc analyses, both Set 1 and Set 2 had greater memory 
accuracy for the ON condition (means= 4.61 and 4.46 respectively) than the 
UNSEEN condition (means = 1.83 and 1.88 respectively) and did not differ from 
each other for these conditions. 
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Figure I. Mean number of correct responses (accuracy) for Set 1 and Set 2 across 
the three experimental conditions. 
However, the difference in memory accuracy between the two sets for the OFF 
condition was significant (p<.01). Whereas Set 1 had significantly higher 
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memory accuracy (p<.01) for the ON condition (mean = 4.61) compared with the 
OFF condition (mean = 2.87), there was no significant difference between the 
means for these conditions for Set 2 (mean ON = 4.46 and OFF =3.96). 
As the interaction involving Set was due solely to the difference in ratings for the 
OFF condition, the two sets were collapsed for the analyses of group differences 
for the memory accuracy data. 
A significant main effect of Set emerged for the Discomfort ratings, F(1,47) = 
4.25, p<.05, with mean ratings being significantly higher across the experimental 
conditions for Set 2 (64.13) than Set 1(48.10). Set was therefore included as a 
between subjects factor in the analyses of group differences for this measure. 
Memory Measures 
Mean Number of Correct Responses 
The mean number of correct responses regarding the status of the stimuli (OFF, 
ON, UNSEEN) provided a measure of overall memory accuracy. As shown in 
Figure 2, the Low checking group was slightly more accurate overall compared 
with the High group in terms of their recall of the condition of the stimulus (OFF, 
ON, UNSEEN). A 2(Group) X 3(Condition) mixed ANOVA revealed that the 
difference between the groups was significant, F(1,47) = 7.95, p<.01. 
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It can also be seen from Figure 2 that both groups had a similar pattern of results 
across the three conditions. Overall, memory accuracy was higher for the ON 
condition compared with the OFF and UNSEEN conditions, with the UNSEEN 
condition having the lowest number of correct responses. 
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Figure 2. Mean Number of Correct Responses (accuracy) for the Low and High 
checking groups across the three experimental conditions. 
The 2(Group) x 3(Condition) repeated measures ANOVA confirmed that the main 
effect of Condition was significant, F(2,94) = 58.15, p<.0L The interaction 
between Group and Condition was not significant. 
Due to the significant group differences with regard to ratings of depression and 
anxiety, the analyses were re-performed using ANCOVAs with BDI-II and BAT 
scores used as the covariates. The Group main effect remained significant for 
both analyses, F(3,44) = 3.73, p<.05 and F(3,44) = 3.42, p<.05 respectively. 
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Memory Certainty Ratings 
A 2(Group) x 3(Condition) mixed ANOVA conducted on the mean memory 
certainty ratings revealed a significant main effect of Condition, F(2,94) = 81.10, 
p<.01. As shown in Figure 3, memory certainty ratings were higher overall for 
the ON condition than the UNSEEN and OFF conditions with the lowest ratings 
reported for the OFF condition. It is also clear from Figure 3 that the Low 
checking group had slightly higher memory certainty scores than the High group 
across the three experimental conditions. 
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Figure 3. Mean Memory Certainty (%) ratings for the High and Low checking 
groups across each experimental condition. 
The 2(Group) x 3(Condition) mixed ANOVA showed that there was a trend for a 
significant main effect of Group, F(1,47) = 3.75, p=.06. The Group by Condition 
interaction was not significant. 
ANCOVA performed on the data revealed that the Group main effect reached 
significance when BAT scores were included as a covariate, F(3,44) = 3.01, p<.05 
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Condi tion interaction was also non-significant . 
Aq dnalo ata .iuuogIu2!s lou sum dnaig Jo rang tnutu oqi `dno.12 2uppotio 
sluyvg aouapfuoD boulapv  
1:l " ._.., c9 
4 
CD Sw X cil (-1) 
al. 00 
Li.) CD • W 
=" 00
. 
 .----, 
_ n 
 s. 
.... 
2
" 4 
 
GA 0 
..... 
0 CD 
0 
CD
,...i., 
''"1 
.... >4 
.2
1 
0 '- • 0 
,-s 
O
 
0 
,
rt. 
 • ''.< 
,
... ‘...,-,,, 
■
-t 
,..< 
■-■ 
■
-• • .-• 
O
00 
 
I-
,  • 
$1) 
■
--. < 
0 
'-'. e) 
0 0 
0 
cn -: 2 
CD A 0 
 
c, 
 
= 0 = 
O
. 0) 
 
CD '-t 
....i ... • 
 
,•-t 
,
- 
,
.1 
CD 
I
l
l'•-
) 
 Z CD B' 0 al. r
l  0 
M 
 5.., 
cn CD 
0 < CD 1:oo 
O
0 
r_
t 
 = :I Ca. 
'CS A) 
CD  
5 
PO s: 
po 
 
2 
co 0 - • 
co- (I
D  
ES CSO 
co 
o 
ell 
co 
s..
. ,.., (.
.g 0 
co co r. 
r 
t—
I 
0 
 
crq 
crg 0 
but was non-significant when BDI-II scores were i ncluded, F(3 ,44) = 1 .68 , p = 
Inspection of the mean memory confidence ratings presented below in Figure 4 
reveals that participants in both groups generall y had greater confidence in their 
M
ea
n 
M
em
or
y 
C
on
fid
en
ce
 
00
 	
00
 
U
I 	
-
 	
cA
 
M
ea
n 
M
em
or
y 
C
on
fid
en
ce
 
00
 	
00
 
U
I 	
cA
 
CD
 
'C:;
 . 
0
 
‘.0
 	
• 
LA
 	
SI
) 	
0
 
CL
. 	
cn
 
.-1
., 
CD
 
'C:;
 . 
0
 
‘.0
 	
• 
LA
 	
SI
) 	
0
 
CL
. 	
cn
 
.-1
., 
A)
 	
CD
 
0
 
•
0
 
C
I,
  
CD
 
CD
 
CL
 
Sao"
  
0
 
CD
 
ca
. 
A)
 	
CD
 
0
 
•
0
 
CI
,  
CD
 
CD
 
CL
 
Sao"
  
0
 
CD
 
ca
. 
CD
 
0
 
CD
 
0
 
VD
 	
0
 	
,-
-.
 t
a,
 
cy
  
',L
., 	
0
 	
CD
 
0
 
II 	
>
 	
0
  
= 
0
 5.,
  
0
 5.,
  `suop!puoo Nggs  
Cognitive Measures 
Perceived Outcomes associated with not Checking 
In order to determine whether the Low and High checking groups differed in 
relation to the perceived consequences of not checking, the responses for both 
groups to the question (3b): "what is the worst thing that could happen?" were 
analysed for common themes. As there were no major differences between Set 1 
and Set 2 with regard to the common themes identified for each of the matched 
stimuli (e.g., heater/iron, car door/boot etc.) (see Appendix D2), the data from 
both sets were pooled. A frequency table comparing the responses, coded 
according to major theme (e.g., break-in/theft, overflow/flood, etc.), for the Low 
and High checking groups across the three experimental conditions (OFF, ON, 
UNSEEN) was constructed (Appendix D2) and the percentage of participants in 
each group recording each common theme identified was calculated. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the majority of participants in both groups reported 
"break-in or theft" as the worst possible outcome across the three experimental 
conditions for the Car door/boot stimuli. It is evident however, that a minority of 
Low checking participants (20%) recorded an alternative response for the OFF 
condition, including "nothing", or "it was off'. 
Table 3. Number of participants and percentage (in parentheses) in the High and 
Low checking groups reporting "break-in/theft" as the worst outcome across 
experimental conditions for the Car door/boot stimuli. 
ON 	OFF 	UNSEEN 
High (N=24) 24 (100%) 22 (91.7%) 23 (95.8%) 
Low (N=25) 24 (96%) 20 (80%) 22 (88%) 
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Similarly, Table 4 shows that there were no major differences between the High 
and Low checkers with regard to the Front/Back door stimuli for the ON and 
UNSEEN conditions, with the majority of participants in both groups again 
reporting break-in/theft as the worst outcome. 
Table 4. Number of participants and percentage (in parentheses) in the High and 
Low checking groups reporting "break-in/theft" as the worst outcome across 
experimental conditions for the Front/back door stimuli. 
ON OFF UNSEEN 
High (N=24) 24 (100%) 24 (100%) 24 (100%) 
Low (N=25) 21(84%) 18 (72%) 21(84%) 
As can be seen in Table 4, a minority of Low checking students (28%) again 
reported "nothing" or "it was off' for the OFF condition. 
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, a similar pattern emerged for the stimuli involving 
electrical appliances (oven/hotplate, heater/iron), with the majority of participants 
in both groups reporting "fire/burns" as the worst outcome. 
Table 5. Number of participants and percentage (in parentheses) in the High and 
Low groups reporting "fire/burns" as the worst outcome across experimental 
conditions for the Oven/Hotplate stimuli. 
ON OFF UNSEEN 
High (N=24) 
Low (N=25) 
24 
19 
(100%) 
(76%) 
24 
17 
(100%) 
(68%) 
24 
19 
(100%) 
(76%) 
Again, a minority of Low checking participants reported other outcomes for both 
stimuli, including "nothing", "waste of electricity", "high electricity bill", 
"overheating" and "I'd feel guilty". However, this was evident across all three 
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conditions, in contrast to only being evident for the OFF condition for the Car 
door/boot and Front/back door stimuli. 
Table 6. Number of participants and percentage (in parentheses) in the High and 
Low groups reporting "fire/bums" as the worst outcome across experimental 
conditions for the Iron/Heater stimuli. 
ON 
	
OFF 	UNSEEN 
High (N=24) 24 (100%) 24 (100%) 24 (100%) 
Low (N=25) 19 (76%) 17 (68%) 19 (76%) 
In contrast to the pattern observed for the other stimuli, a trend emerged for 
participants in the High group to also report other outcomes for the tap stimuli 
(sink/bathroom tap). As can be seen in Table 7, although the majority of 
participants in both groups reported "flood" as the worst possible outcome, a 
minority in both the Low and High groups reported other outcomes, including 
"waste of water" or "running out of water", "high electricity bills" or "nothing". 
Table 7. Number of participants and percentage (in parentheses) in the High and 
Low groups reporting "flood" as the worst outcome across experimental 
conditions for the sink/bathroom tap stimuli. 
ON OFF UNSEEN 
High (N=24) 
Low (N=25) 
18 
16 
(75%) 
(64%) 
15 
16 
(62.5%) 
(64%) 
19 
18 
(79.17%) 
(72%) 
In summary, the same themes generally emerged between the High and Low 
checking groups across the experimental conditions for each of the individual 
(paired) stimuli, indicating there were no major differences in the perceived 
outcome between the groups. However, a minority of Low checking participants 
reported other outcomes, including "nothing" and "it was off' across conditions 
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for all of the stimuli with the exception of the Car door/boot stimuli where this 
only occurred for the OFF condition. This may suggest a tendency of low 
checking individuals to downplay potentially adverse consequences. Finally, 
there was a trend for a minority (20-25%) of participants in both groups to report 
"other" outcomes for the tap stimuli. This might indicate that the outcomes 
arising from these stimuli were not regarded as being as great a threat compared 
with the possible outcomes associated with the other stimuli. 
Cost and Probability of Danger Ratings 
In addition to listing the worst possible outcome that might result as a 
consequence of not checking, participants were required to rate the "cost" 
associated with the outcome and the likelihood ("probability") of it occurring. 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the High checking group reported greater Cost of 
Danger ratings across all three experimental conditions compared with the Low 
checking group. A 2(Group) x 3(Condition) mixed ANOVA confirmed that the 
main effect of Group was significant, F(1,47) = 6.26, p<.05. That is, High 
checking participants regarded the perceived aversive outcomes as being far more 
severe than Low checking individuals. However, ANCOVA revealed that 
although this difference remained significant when BAT scores were covaried, 
F(3,44) = 2.94, p<.05, the difference between the groups fell below the 
significance level when BDI-H scores were included, F(3,44) = 2.39, p=.08. 
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Figure 5. Mean Cost of Danger ratings for the Low and High checking groups 
across each experimental condition. 
As indicated in Figure 5, the 2(Group) x 3(Condition) mixed ANOVA showed 
that neither the main effect of Condition, nor the Group by Condition interaction 
were significant. 
A 2(Group) x 3(Condition) mixed ANOVA revealed that the High and Low 
checking groups did not differ significantly with regard to mean Probability of 
Danger ratings. As shown in Figure 6, both groups reported roughly similar and 
relatively low (<40%) ratings for the likelihood of the aversive outcome 
occurring. However, a significant main effect of Condition was found, F(2,94) = 
9.66, p<.0L Overall, participants reported higher Probability of Danger ratings 
for the 01-4- condition compared to the UNSEEN condition and the ON condition 
that had relatively low ratings. The Group by Condition interaction was not 
significant. 
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Figure 6. Mean Probability of Danger ratings for the Low and High "checking 
groups across each experimental condition. 
Personal Responsibility Ratings 
High and Low checking participants were also required to provide ratings of how 
personally responsible they would feel in relation to the worst possible outcome 
occurring. As illustrated in Figure 7, High checking participants reported overall 
significantly higher ratings of personal responsibility compared to the Low 
checking participants across the three experimental conditions. For both groups, 
personal responsibility was greater for the OFF condition compared to the 
UNSEEN condition or the ON condition that had the lowest ratings. 
A mixed 2(Group) x 3(Condition) ANOVA conducted on the mean Personal 
Responsibility data revealed significant main effects of Group, F(1,47) = 5.34, 
p<.05 and Condition, F(2,94) = 8.76, p<.01. The Group by Condition interaction 
was not significant. 
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Figure 7. Mean Personal Responsibility ratings for the High and Low checking 
groups across the experimental conditions. 
However, when the influence of BAT and BDI-II scores was accounted for in 
ANCOVA, the significant difference between the High and Low checking groups 
disappeared, F(3,44) = 2.14, p = .11 and F(3,44) = 1.39, p=.26 respectively. 
Intolerance for Uncertainty 
In order to determine the level of intolerance for uncertainty among high and low 
checking individuals, participants were required to provide ratings of their desire 
to check and discomfort associated with not checking. 
It is clear from Figure 8 that the High checking group reported overall greater 
Desire to Check ratings compared to the Low checking group across the 
experimental conditions. 
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Figure 8. Mean Desire to Check ratings for the High and Low checking groups 
across the three experimental conditions. 
A 2(Group) x 3(Condition) mixed ANOVA confirmed that the difference in 
ratings between the two groups was significant, F(1,47) = 5.48, p<.05. However, 
ANCOVA showed that the group difference fell below the significance level 
when BDI-II, F(3,44) = 2.36, p = .08 and BAI, F(3,44) = 2.53, p = .07 scores were 
included as covariates. 
As shown in Figure 8, mean Desire to Check ratings were highest for the OFF 
condition, followed by the UNSEEN condition and the ON condition that had 
relatively low ratings. The analysis found that the main effect of Condition was 
significant, F(2,94) = 21.61, p<.01. The Group by Condition interaction did not 
reach significance. 
Due to the finding of a significant difference between the sets for the Discomfort 
associated with Checking measure, the mean ratings were subjected to a 2(Group) 
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x 2(Set) x 3(Condition) mixed ANOVA. The analysis confirmed that the Group 
main effect, F(1,45) = 8.54, p<.01, and Set main effect, F(1,45) = 4.73, p<.05 
were significant. Overall, the High group reported greater discomfort associated 
with not checking than the Low group, and Set 2 had higher discomfort ratings 
compared with Set 1. However, as shown in Figure 9, a significant Group by Set 
interaction, F(1, 45) = 5.08, p<.05 modified this interpretation. None of the main 
effects or interactions involving Condition reached significance. 
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Figure 9. Mean Discomfort associated with not Checking ratings for the High 
and Low checking groups across the two stimulus sets. 
Post hoc tests confirmed that whereas the High checking group had similarly high 
ratings of discomfort for both sets, there was a significant (p<.01) increase in 
discomfort ratings for the Low group from Set 1 to Set 2. As suggested in Figure 
9, there was a significant difference between the groups for Set 1 (p<.01) but not 
for Set 2. It is worth noting however, that when Set was collapsed, the Group 
difference remained significant, F(1,47) = 6.87, p<.05. Therefore the finding of a 
significant Set main effect may simply be an experimental anomaly. The fact that 
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the sets were comparable for all of the other cognitive or memory measures, with 
the exception of memory accuracy, supports this interpretation. 
However, ANCOVA with BDI-II and BAT scores as covariates performed on the 
Discomfort data revealed that the significant difference between the groups 
disappeared when the influence of depression, F(3,44) = 2.21, p = .10 and anxiety, 
F(3,44) = 2.28, p = .09 were accounted for. 
Summary of Results 
In addition to significantly higher levels of checking behaviour, High checking 
students also reported greater overall levels of obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
compared with Low checking individuals. Further, High checking participants 
reported significantly higher levels of anxiety and depression, although within the 
'normal' to 'mild' range, than their Low checking counterparts. There were no 
significant differences between High and Low checking students in terms of their 
estimated intellectual ability or auditory or spatial (memory for actions) working 
memory. 
With regard to the memory measures, memory accuracy and memory certainty 
and confidence were higher overall for the ON condition compared to the 
UNSEEN condition, with the OFF condition having the lowest ratings. Across 
the conditions, High checking participants were significantly less accurate in their 
recall of the stimuli than Low checking students. This difference remained 
significant when depression and anxiety level were taken into account. Although 
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there was a trend for High checkers to have lower certainty about their memories, 
this difference disappeared when depression scores were included as a covariate 
in the analyses. Conversely, the group difference reached significance when the 
influence of anxiety was accounted for. 
In contrast to the memory measures, ratings for most of the cognitive measures 
(personal responsibility, probability of danger and desire to check) were 
significantly higher overall for the OFF condition compared with the UNSEEN 
condition or ON condition that had the lowest ratings. Although both groups 
generally reported similar aversive outcomes resulting from not checking, High 
checking participants recorded significantly higher ratings of cost of danger, in 
addition to personal responsibility, discomfort associated with not checking and 
desire to check. However, these differences generally did not remain significant 
when BDI-II and BAI scores were covaried in the analyses. Nevertheless, there 
was evidence for a trend for High checkers to report significantly greater cost of 
danger and desire to check ratings irrespective of anxiety or depression level. 
Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate the cognitive and memory phenomena proposed to 
underlie obsessive-compulsive checking in a non-clinical student sample using 
ecologically valid stimuli. In line with previous research, it was hypothesised that 
participants engaging in high levels of checking would report greater levels of 
personal responsibility, intolerance for uncertainty and higher probability and cost 
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of danger estimates. Consistent with the memory research, it was also 
hypothesised that High checking participants would have poorer memory for 
actions and report lower confidence and certainty in memory compared with Low 
checking students. These hypotheses were partially supported. 
Contrary to the hypotheses, there were no significant differences in memory 
confidence ratings between the High and Low checkers. Additionally, theme 
analysis of the data concerning perceived aversive outcomes resulting from not 
checking indicated there were no major differences between High and Low 
checking students. More specifically, the majority of students in both groups 
reported break-in or theft as the 'worst possible outcome' resulting from not 
checking the house or car doors, flood as arising from not checking taps and fire 
or burns in relation to the electrical appliances. Further, the two experimental 
groups both reported similarly low to moderate probability of danger ratings in 
relation to these outcomes. 
Although high checking participants were characterised by significantly greater 
perceived responsibility, desire to check and discomfort associated with not 
checking ratings compared to Low checkers, analyses indicated that the group 
differences disappeared once the influence of anxiety and depression level were 
taken into account. Similarly, a trend emerged for High checkers to report lower 
memory certainty, but this disappeared when the higher levels of depression in 
this group were accounted for. Finally, the expected interaction for the UNSEEN 
condition, which was expected to differentially provoke intolerance for 
uncertainty concerns in High checking participants relative to their peers and 
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result in the endorsement of higher ratings on the other cognitive measures was 
not found. 
However, in line with the hypotheses, High checking participants were found to 
rate the "cost" of the aversive outcomes as significantly greater compared to the 
Low checking group. That is, although High checkers perceived the likelihood of 
harm to be reasonably low, they believed the severity of the outcome to be far 
greater than their Low checking peers. The higher general anxiety levels of the 
High checking group did not influence this tendency. Further, although the higher 
depression levels of the High checking group were found to moderate this 
difference, a clear non-significant trend remained for High checkers to 
"catastrophise" about the cost of danger resulting from not checking. Similarly, a 
trend for High checking participants to report greater desire to check compared to 
their Low checking peers remained after the influence of depression and anxiety 
was analysed. 
Also in line with the hypotheses, High checking participants were significantly 
less accurate than Low checkers for memory for actions on the checking task 
despite the finding that the two experimental groups were comparable with regard 
to their overall estimated intelligence, auditory working memory ability and 
working memory for actions. Consistent with the findings of Sher et al. (1984), 
Ecker and Engelkamp (1995) and Rubensteing et al. (1993), this difference could 
not be explained by the influence of anxiety or depression. 
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This finding has important implications for the specific nature and location of the 
memory deficit involved in obsessive-compulsive checking. Information 
processing investigations of anxiety disorders have consistently found a selective 
attention bias favouring the enhanced processing of threatening information 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Summerfeldt & Endler, 1998; Tata, Leibowitz, 
Prunty, Cameron & Pickering, 1996). Given these findings, it would seem logical 
to assume that memory for threat would be enhanced in obsessive-compulsive 
checking due to the increased processing. However, clinical observations note 
that individuals with obsessive-compulsive checking frequently report being 
unable to clearly recall performing a checking-related action such as turning off 
the stove, even when the action was performed moments previously (Rachman & 
Shafran, 1998). As previously discussed, there is a growing body of evidence 
suggesting a deficit in memory for actions underlies this behaviour (e.g., Ecker & 
Engelkamp, 1995; Rubenstein et al., 1993; Tallis et al., 1999; Zitterl et al., 2001). 
It is possible that the memory deficit may arise from the competing demands of 
hypervigilance for threat and cognitive appraisal processes. That is, although 
obsessive-compulsive checkers may attend more vigorously to the threat-related 
stimuli than low checking individuals, appraisal processes interfere with the 
encoding or storage of the memory. In support of this theory, Woods et al. (2002) 
have suggested that the poorer memory performance observed in obsessive-
compulsive checking might be secondary to higher order meta-cognitive 
processes such as exaggerated cost appraisals. Memory impairment would 
therefore not be observed in threat-irrelevant situations. 
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Studies that have failed to find a memory for actions deficit in checking behaviour 
may therefore not have used appropriately threatening materials. This issue 
clearly requires further exploration. A relationship between memory impairment 
and checking symptoms also remains to be demonstrated. 
Although the results of the present study support models proposing that poorer 
memory for actions and, to a lesser extent, higher cost of danger and desire to 
check beliefs, mediate checking behaviour, they challenge a number of existing 
models of obsessive-compulsive checking. There was no support for heightened 
probability of danger estimations and reduced confidence or certainty in memory. 
Additionally, the results of the present study challenge the proposal that inflated 
personal responsibility beliefs or intolerance for uncertainty concerns have a 
central role in mediating checking behaviour, with group differences being 
moderated by anxiety and depression. Several explanations are possible to 
explain the discrepancies between the findings of the present study and previous 
research. 
Cognitive models proposing exaggerated threat appraisal have emphasised that 
both probability and cost of danger ratings are inflated in obsessive-compulsive 
checking (e.g. Carr, 1974; McFall & Wollersheim, 1979). However, the results of 
this investigation indicated that heightened cost of danger estimates alone, are 
sufficient to drive checking behaviour. A similar conclusion was made by 
Menzies et al. (2000) who reported that experimentally manipulating personal 
responsibility led to increased severity of danger (cost) ratings but no difference in 
likelihood (probability) of danger ratings. 
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Both Beck et al. (1985) and Salkovskis et al. (1998) have suggested that checking 
behaviour arises due to the interplay of beliefs concerning the probability and 
"awfulness" of the likely outcome, perceptions of coping capacity and external 
"rescue" factors: 
Probability * Cost 
Coping + Rescue 
According to this model then, it is not necessary for probability estimations to be 
high, provided cost of danger ratings are elevated and perceptions of coping and 
rescue factors are relatively low. Therefore, it may be that High checking 
individuals, whilst identifying similar consequences of not checking and 
comparable probabilities, catastrophise about the "awfulness" of the predicted 
outcome and their capacity to cope with an aversive threat. This explanation is 
consistent with clinical observations indicating that many individuals with 
obsessional concerns recognise the irrationality of their fears, but report that they 
would not be able to cope if the unlikely event did occur (Salkovskis et al., 1998). 
The inclusion of a measure of perceived ability to cope with the predicted 
aversive outcome resulting from not checking in future studies would allow this 
possibility to be more fully explored. 
With regard to the lack of significant group differences for personal responsibility 
beyond anxiety and depression, it should be noted that not all studies have found 
evidence in support of this cognitive mediator (e.g., Emmelkamp & Aardema, 
1999; Menzies et al., 2000). Further, previous research favouring a role of 
inflated responsibility beliefs has generally not controlled for the influence of 
mood (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 1996; Lopakta & Rachman, 1995). An exception is 
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the research of Foa et al. (2002), in which depression and anxiety scores were 
included as covariates in their analyses. 
As previously reported, Steketee et al. (1998) found that only the "Tolerance for 
Uncertainty" subscale explained significant variance among OCD symptom 
scores beyond depression, anxiety and worry. That is, responsibility beliefs did 
not distinguish between controls, individuals with OCD and those with other 
anxiety disorders beyond mood state. Further, although Foa et al. (2002) 
concluded that obsessive-compulsive checkers have an inflated perception of 
responsibility for harm, once depression and anxiety were accounted for, 
responsibility ratings were significantly higher for obsessive-compulsive checkers 
compared to non-anxious controls for only one of the three scenario types used in 
their experiment. 
Given these findings and the results of the current study, it may be that inflated 
personal responsibility beliefs are not specific to obsessive-compulsive checking, 
but rather a function of more general mood disturbances. That is, inflated 
personal responsibility, although being prominent in checking behaviour, may not 
be a unique feature of the disorder. 
The lack of support for intolerance for uncertainty in checking behaviour is harder 
to reconcile. The OCCWG (1997) stated that intolerance of uncertainty involves 
beliefs concerning the necessity of being certain, inability to cope with 
unpredictable change and difficulty functioning in ambiguous environments. It 
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was therefore hypothesised that the UNSEEN condition would provoke 
intolerance for uncertainty concerns due to the ambiguity involved. 
Contrary to expectations, High checking students did not show greater distress, as 
assessed by their ratings on the cognitive measures, for the UNSEEN condition 
compared to the Low checkers. Further, High checking participants did not report 
higher ratings of desire to check and discomfort associated with not checking 
compared with Low checkers, once anxiety and depression levels were controlled 
for, although there was a trend for higher desire to check ratings in the High 
group. However, it could be argued that this measure tapped a more general "urge 
to check" schema as opposed to specific intolerance for uncertainty beliefs. 
The results therefore contradict the findings of Steketee et al. (1998) but support 
the assertion of Mancini et al. (2002) who believed intolerance for uncertainty 
beliefs may subserve higher order cognitive appraisals in OCD. It should be 
noted however, that whereas a mixed sample of individuals with OCD was 
compared with controls and individuals with other anxiety disorders in the 
Steketee et al. (1998) study, Mancini et al. (2002) based their findings on results 
obtained from a normal population. 
The lack of significant intolerance for uncertainty differences, beyond anxiety and 
depression, in the present study could therefore be attributable to the use of a 
nonclinical sample. The inclusion of an obsessive-compulsive checking group in 
future research would assist in clarifying this issue. Nevertheless, the concept of 
intolerance for uncertainty is a relatively recent development in the OCD 
93 
literature. Empirical support is not robust and is based largely on results obtained 
from beliefs inventories. The results of the present study, which used checking 
relevant stimuli to assess potential cognitive mediators suggest that while 
intolerance for uncertainty beliefs may be endorsed on paper, they play only a 
secondary role under more realistic checking conditions. 
In contrast to the findings of several recent investigations, the present study also 
failed to support a role for reduced confidence or certainty in memory. However, 
it is worth examining the experimental procedures used in the research supporting 
these phenomenona. The majority of studies have used stimuli that are not 
directly related to checking behaviour. For example, tracing or imaginal tracing 
(e.g., McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993), imagined or actual performance of verbally 
presented simple actions (e.g., Merckelbach & Wessel, 2000), word lists (e.g., 
MacDonald et al., 1997; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993), general knowledge 
questionnaires (Dar et al., 2000) and neuropsychological batteries (Zitterl et al., 
2001) have all been employed to assess memory confidence. 
It could be argued that the findings of research using these paradigms have little 
bearing on the processes underlying actual checking behaviour. In support of this 
interpretation, studies using more ecologically valid stimuli have found evidence 
to suggest that a reduction in memory confidence only emerges after repeated 
exposure to the stimuli in both clinical (e.g., Tolin et al., 2001) and non-clinical 
participants (e.g., van den Hout & Kindt, 2003). As the participants in the present 
study were not given the opportunity to conduct repeated checks, a reduction in 
memory confidence and certainty may not have emerged. It would therefore be 
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worthwhile modifying the existing checking program to allow participants to re-
check the scenes and re-rate the cognitive and memory measures. This would also 
have the advantage of providing an objective measure of the amount of checking 
behaviour, compared to the reliance on self-report data in the current 
investigation. 
An alternative explanation for the lack of significant group differences in relation 
to the cognitive and memory measures is that the experimental procedure was not 
sufficiently threat-inducing to engage these processes beyond mood state. 
Although the participants were instructed to respond to the questions according to 
how they would feel in the situation, they were not required to actually engage 
with the stimuli. Hence, the checking situations were of a vicarious nature. 
Previous research has consistently observed that compulsive checkers experience 
more discomfort and difficulty when they carry out the relevant checking activity 
in their own environments (Rachman, 1976). Compulsive checkers typically 
experience little or no feelings of responsibility in the homes or workplaces of 
other people, including laboratories, implying that responsibility concerns only 
emerge within an individual's "psychological territory" (Rachman & Shafran, 
1998). That is, when the individual has a vested interest in their environment. It 
is conceivable that similar conditions might be necessary to induce the intolerance 
for uncertainty and memory confidence impairments believed to be involved in 
checking behaviour. 
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In support of this explanation, Rubenstein et al. (1993) and Ecker and Engelkamp 
(1995) reported that deficits in memory for actions occurred only on tasks 
performed by the participants themselves. An in vivo procedure could be 
employed in future research, in which the participants are required to rate 
responsibility, concerns, intolerance for uncertainty, memory confidence and other 
potential cognitive mediators after completing typical checking tasks such as 
locking a door. A procedure of this type might elicit the elevated responsibility or 
intolerance for uncertainty concerns, or produce reductions in memory confidence 
and certainty. However, several investigations using non-specific and impersonal 
stimuli have found these variables to differ between high and low checking 
individuals, thus challenging this explanation. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, 
few of these have controlled for the influence of mood state. 
Although this research has addressed a methodological shortcoming of previous 
research relating to the use of inappropriate stimuli, and thereby provided a more 
valid picture of the cognitive and memory processes involved in obsessive-
compulsive checking, several improvements could be made. The current 
investigation does not shed light on the relative contributions of the cognitive and 
memory factors to checking behaviour. Stepwise multiple regression or principal 
components analyses with the participants' checking symptom scores held 
constant would help to resolve this issue. However, a much larger sample size 
than the one used in the present study would be required in order to ensure 
adequate statistical power. 
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In addition to employing an in vivo procedure and an objective measure of 
checking behaviour as previously discussed, repeating the investigation with a 
more homogenous sample of high checking individuals would help to clarify the 
findings of the current research. The participants in the High checking group had 
a relatively wide range of PI-R 'Checking' subscale scores and also engaged in 
higher levels of other obsessive or compulsive symptoms, such as washing, 
ordering or magical thinking compared to the Low checking group. It is 
conceivable that the differences between the groups, or lack thereof, may be 
attributable to the poorly defined High checking group or more general 
compulsive behaviour. 
Specifying a more restricted cut-off score for checking behaviour and obtaining 
symptom profiles from the PI-R would therefore improve the experimental 
design. The inclusion of a measure of the nature and level of the participants' 
daily checking activity would also be a useful modification to the experimental 
procedure. This would allow for a more complete profile of checking behaviour 
both during the experiment and in day-to-day functioning to be obtained. Further 
investigations could also compare the cognitive and memory processes involved 
in checking between correct and incorrect identifications of the stimuli (i.e., 
memory for actions comparisons). A larger sample size would allow for this 
analysis to be conducted. 
Finally, it is recommended that future research consider the inclusion of a clinical 
OCD checking group. This would allow for comparisons between nonclinical and 
clinical checkers. Additionally, comparisons between these populations and non- 
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checking clinical anxiety groups and a non-checking clinical OCD group would 
be useful in determining the extent to which the various cognitive and memory 
features are specific to OCD as opposed to being present in the general population 
or among other anxiety disorders. It would also allow for comparisons between 
the different OCD subtypes, thus informing debate surrounding the existing 
conceptualisation of the disorder. 
Conclusions 
Although the cognitive and memory processes believed to underlie obsessive-
compulsive checking have been well-researched, many studies have used stimuli 
unrelated to checking behaviour. The present research has therefore made a 
significant contribution to the literature by investigating these processes using 
more ecologically valid stimuli. In accordance with several previous 
investigations, High checking participants had reduced memory for checking-
related actions. Checking behaviour was also found to be characterised by 
cognitions concerning inflated personal responsibility, intolerance for uncertainty 
and overestimation of the severity of potential harm. However, once the higher 
anxiety and depression levels of the High checking group were included in the 
analyses, these differences disappeared. Nevertheless, a trend for High checkers 
to report greater cost of danger and desire to check remained. A role for 
probability of danger estimations and memory certainty and confidence in 
checking behaviour previously reported in the literature was not supported by this 
study. 
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In order to obtain further clarification of the specific cognitive and memory 
processes involved in checking behaviour, it is recommended that future research 
investigate these processes in vivo, comparing control, high checking, anxious and 
obsessive-compulsive subtypes. Further, studies employing more sophisticated 
data analyses, such as principal components or regression analysis, would allow 
for the relative contributions of the cognitive and memory variables to be 
ascertained. A coherent model of obsessive-compulsive checking could then be 
articulated. 
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Appendix A: Individual Participant Data and Checking Program 
The Checking Program relies on Microsoft Office software. If you experience 
any problems running the program, please contact the School of Psychology, 
University of Tasmania, on: +61 3 6226 2237 or Private Bag 30 Hobart Tas. 7001. 
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Appendix B I: Participant Information Sheet 
Thought and Memory Processes in Checking Behaviour 
Chief Investigators: Professor Kenneth C Kirkby and Dr Frances Martin 
Researcher: Louise Dewis 
Purpose of the Study: This Masters study aims to investigate some of the 
thought and memory processes that underlie checking behaviour. 
To be included in this study you need to be able to use a standard computer, are of 
average intelligence, not currently on psychotropic medication, and don't have any 
anxiety or depressive disorder. To assess this, you will be asked to complete a 
series of pen and paper questionnaires and tests that will help assess your current 
level of checking behaviour, performance on memory tasks, general intellectual 
ability, and levels of anxiety and depression. 
If you are selected to continue participation in the study, you will then be asked to 
complete a checking task that will be presented via a computer. The details and 
requirements of this task will be explained to you fully beforehand and you will have 
the opportunity to ask any questions. After completion of each video scenario, you 
will be presented with a series of questions relating to the task. At the end of 
these tasks, you will be asked to complete a memory test and answer some more 
questions relating to the checking tasks. The total time commitment for 
participation in the investigations will be between 1-2 hours. 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may withdraw from the study at 
any time without penalty. There is no payment for the study, but you will receive 
course credit for participation. 
The information you give us is confidential. The data will be kept in a locked filing 
cabinet in the Discipline of Psychiatry and only the principal researchers will have 
access to this. The results of the study may be published or presented, however 
the data will be coded to ensure individual participants cannot be identified. You 
. may have access to any future publications if required. 
This investigation has been approved by the University of Tasmania Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have any ethical concerns or complaints about the manner 
in which the investigation is conducted, you may contact: Ms Chris Hooper 
(Secretary) on (03) 6226 2763. 
If you have any questions or worries about this study and what is required of you, 
please contact Louise Dewis via email: Imdewiseutas.edu.au , Professor Ken Kirkby 
during business hours on (03) 6226 4885 or Dr Frances Martin on (03) 6226 2262. 
You will be given copies of the information sheet and consent form to keep. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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Appendix B2: Participant Consent Form 
Thought and Memory Processes in Checking Behaviour 
1. I have read and understood the information sheet for this study. 
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
3. I understand that the study involves the following procedures: 
• Completing screening questionnaires 
• Completing a computerised video checking task and then answering 
questions about the task 
• Completing memory tests and answering some other questions about the 
video 
4. Any questions I currently have about the study have been answered to 
my satisfaction. 
5. I agree that the research data gathered for the study may be published 
provided that I cannot be identified as a participant. 
6. I give my permission to participate in this investigation and understand 
that I may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. 
Participant Section: 
Name of Participant 	  
Signature 	  
bate 	  
Researcher Section: 
I have explained this study and the implications of involvement to the 
participant. I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she 
understands the implications of participation. 
Name of Researcher 	  
Signature 	  
bate 	  
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Appendix B3: Participant Data Sheet 
Thought and Memory Processes in Checking Behaviour 
Date: 
02LD 	 
  
Participant ID: 
  
Personal Details 
Name: 	  Sex: Male/Female 
Date of Birth: 	 
Address: 	  
Postcode  
Phone: Home 	  Work 	  Mobile 	  
Email: 	  
University Course: 	  
Occupation (if any):  
!Medical Details 
Do you have a heart condition or any other serious physical condition? 
YES/NO 
If YES, please specify your condition(s) 	  
Do you have or have you ever been diagnosed with a psychological 
condition? 	 YES/NO 
If YES, please specify your condition(s) and any treatment you have 
received 	  
Are you currently taking any medication for any conditions? 
YES/NO 
If YES, what medication? 	  
Do you drink alcohol? 	 YES/NO 
If YES, how many drinks on average would you drink in a week? 	 
Do you smoke cigarettes? 	 YES/NO 
If YES, how many cigarettes on average do you smoke each day? 	 
Age: 	  
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Participation Details 
Please indicate the level of previous experience you have had with using 
a computer mouse by circling the appropriate number below: 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 	8 	9 	10 
1 
   
   
None Moderate 	 A Lot 
Would you be interested in being contacted for any follow-up studies? 
YES/NO 
If YES, please provide the following information to assist in getting in 
touch with you: 
Next of Kin: 	  Relationship to you: 	  
Address:  
Postcode: 	  
Do you wish to be sent a summary of the results of this study? 
YES/NO 
1Test Battery Results 
BDI Total Score 	  
NART Score 	  
WAIS-III Digit Span 	 
BAI Total Score 	  
WMS-R Spatial Span 
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WAIS-III bigit Span 
Digit Span Forward 
I am going to say some numbers. Listen carefully, and when lam through, I 
want you to say them right after me. Just say what I say. 
Digit Span Backward 
Now I am going to say some more numbers. But this time when I stop, I 
want you to say them backward For example, if I say 7-1-9, what would you 
say? 
If correct: 
That's right. (PROCEED) 
If incorrect: 
No, you would say 9-1-7 I saic/ 7-1-9, so to say it backward, you 
would say 9-1-7 Now try these numbers. Remember, you are to say 
them backward: 3-4-8. (PROCEED) 
Digits Forward Trial 
Score 
Item 
Score 
Digits Backward Trial 
Score 
Item 
Score 
1.1 1-7 1.1 2-4 
.2 6-3 .2 5-7 
2.1 5-8-2 2.1 6-2-9 
.2 6-9-4 .2 4-1-5 
3.1 6-4-3-9 3.1 3-2-7-9 
.2 7-2-8-6 .2 4-9-6-8 
4.1 4-2-7-3-1 4.1 1-5-2-8-6 
.2 7-5-8-3-6 .2 6-1-8-4-3 
5.1 6-1-9-4-7-3 5.1 5-3-9-4-1-8 
.2 3-9-2-4-8-7 .2 7-2-4-8-5-6 
6.1 5-9-1-7-4-2-8 6.1 8-1-2-9-3-6-5 
.2 4-1-7-9-3-8-6 .2 4-7-3-9-1-2-8 
7.1 5-8-1-9-2-6-4-7 7.1 9-4-3-7-6-2-5-8 
.2 3-8-2-9-5-1-7-4 .2 7-2-8-1-9-6-5-3 
8.1 2-7-5-8-6-2-5-8-4 Digits Backward Total Score 
(Maximum = 14) .2 7-1-3-9-4-2-5-6-8 
Digits Forward Total Score 
(Maximum = 16) 
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WM5-II Spatial Span 
Spatial Span Forward 
Now I want you to do exactly what I do. Touch the blocks I touch, in the 
same order. 
Spatial Span Backward 
Now lam going to touch some more blocks. This time when I stop, I want 
you to touch the blocks backwards, in reverse order of mine. For example, if 
I touch this block (3) then this one (5), what would you do? 
If correct: 
That's right. Here's the next one. Remember to touch them in 
reverse order. (PROCEED) 
If incorrect: 
No, I touched this one, then this one; so to do it in reverse, you would 
touch this one, then this one. Now let's try another one. If I touch 
this one (9), then this one (I), what would you do? (PROCEED) 
55 Forward Trial 
Score 
Item 
Score 
SS Backward Trial 
Score 
Item 
Score 
1.1 3-10 1.1 7-4 
.2 7-4 .2 3-10 
2.1 1-9-3 2.1 8-2-7 
.2 8-2-7 .2 1-9-3 
3.1 4-9-1-6 3.1 10-6-2-7 
.2 10-6-2-7 .2 4-9-1-6 
4.1 6-5-1-4-8 4.1 5-7-9-8-2 
.2 5-7-9-8-2 .2 6-5-1-4-8 
5.1 4-1-9-3-8-10 5.1 9-2-6-7-3-5 
.2 9-2-6-7-3-5 .2 4-1-9-3-8-10 
6.1 10-1-6-4-8-5-7 6.1 2-6-3-8-2-10-1 
.2 2-6-3-8-2-10-1 .2 10-1-6-4-8-5-7 
7.1 7-3-10-5-7-8-4-9 7.1 6-9-3-2-1-7-10-5 
.2 6-9-3-2-1-7-10-5 .2 7-3-10-5-7-8-4-9 
8.1 5-8-4-10-7-3-1-9-6 8.1 8-2-6-1-10-7-3-4-9 
.2 8-2-6-1-10-3-7-4-9 .2 5-8-4-10-7-3-1-9-6 
	
Forward Total Score 
	 Backward Total Score 
(Maximum = 16) (Maximum: 16) 
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78.00! 	80.00 I 	8-07-08-1 	98.00: 	97.501 	100.00! 	14.00 	64.151 	-4-6.67 
102L D26 .[,. .: 
03L D05 . S .. 
•02L DO4 :1 ! 
i 
	
37.501 	21.671 
_ 	50.00. _50.001. 
37.08! 	40.401 
10.831 	0.001 
_ 23.75 : 	6.00] 
46.00.  
35.001 	100.00! 	100.001 	100.00! 	73.331 	73.331 	55.00 , 
02L D13 " 60.001 	0.001 	0.06 	0.00! 	73.13! 100.06 100.00 
100.001 	62.50 
100.00! 	25.00 
88.00 L 	78,75 
59-.171. 	41 .25 
02L D21.1 .. 34.381 
25.83! 
6.881 
-52. -6.-61 
86.67! 	88.00: 	96.25! 	41.67! 
22.081 	7.00; 	30.831 	18.331 
40.831 	15.06.....__8,00 1._ 49.17 
!02L D061: :. 
02L027.!!! 
.02L D16 •=. 87.00! 	88.331 	89.3-81 	-2-676-0 
[ 62L D41 •!;••. 68.001 	63.751 	70.001 	68.001 	75.001 	74.00! 	95.40! 	92.251 	97.20 
68.00! 	22.50] 	27.001 	100.00! 	100.001 	100.00 	65.00= 	85.001. 	85.53 , 02L D45 .. 
'02L D36 '.! 
T- 
25.001 	24 001 	27 001 [ _ 	• 	, 	___ 	. 	j...m. 
-4.-3-31 	1.20 1 	-2-.60; 4 ; 
94.171 	94.001 	91.001 	30.83! 	 50 . 00 : „.- ..--,-, 
89.00! 	-60.00 02 L D2C . . 
. 	*.........,- 	, .....- 
-80.83! 	37.00: 	62.00! 	3.31 
.02L D12. != 38.75! 	24.00i 
 3.8,751_ 40.06 
18.751 	18.001 
10.001 	40.001 
71.001 	50.00 
26.001. 	88.751 	76.00! 	84.001 	35. po 
, 	60.00! 	. 97.56 . 	2000. 	40.00: 	50.00! 
14.001 	67.501 	48.001 	56.001 	48.75i . -- ------_-__*--, 
! 	94.001 	76.00 
100.001 10600 
98.00! 	76.00 .--.....---__ 
100.001  1 00.00 
100.00! 	89.00 
100.0,0 [ 	82,00 
59.80i  . 	. 
1.00 -,001-7. 7-.5-0 
-9ii.-66 33.75  
71.25! 	33.33 
50.00! 	12.50 
97.40. 	31.67  .!..... 	.  
97.00: 	50.00 
53.751_ 50.-60 
100.00: 	-43.75 
75.00. 	49.17 
47.50 	31.67 
00.001_50.00 
-9-5-!. -6-0! 	6i33 _ .  
94.00 [ -5-0.00 
92.00' 	62.50  
40.00! 	55.00 
97.80 	93.75 
95. 8-01_--4-3-.-6.3 
-9-6.-6-01 -4-7.-60  
50.60 . 
02L011-•! . 
.02L D25, ', 
02LD18.••!•• 42. po : 
68.001 
8.401 
57.33 . 	j_.  
30.00 	 32.001 	1.5,001 	20.001 
72.001 	66.001 	68.001 	24.001 
81.001 	73.001 	72.00! 	16.001 
99.13 	9900 	99 .. ., 	1 _ 50.  _ 
24.171 	a2."Ool_ 	26125--1.. 	. 26,671 
57.50! 	44.00i 	77. 6iii 	2.601 - 	, 	....[..-.. --..., ......._. 
100.00! 	98.75! 	96.67 ! 	53.31 
66.67! 	37.50 i 	87.501 	0.001 
66.67! 	47.00! 	72.921 	44.171 . 
76.88' 	86.25! 	86.17 1 	75 001 
55.50 , 	40.63! 	38.33 	50.63. 
38. 00 L 50.06_ .95,..00 L . , 53,75! 
100 .00' 	100.00' 	1 00.00' 	37.50! 
75.00! 	38.751 	52.50! 	12.501 
02L D07 ;•.: '2 
02LD1.0: [ •:: 8.00! 	8.40; 
54.50 	34. 102L D35 
.02Lb44. : . • _33,331 	1400 	 
18.331 	6.001 	8.75! , - 	. 	..-- , : 	- 	. . 02L D15 ..• • 
!OL D50 !: 70.831 	66.251 	77.501 
02LD46'..':. .. 7.75! 	7.751 
12.671 	16.001 
21.25 [ 	2000. 
11.501 
38.33! 
27 50'   
43.331 
28. 75! .._ 
66.67: 
33.33! 
15.83: 
”1 .421 
47.-50i 
4.17!   
65.001 
02LD47 '..• : 
02LD39 .: 	• 
02LD49.•• 30.63! 	34. 38 
_ 66. 25 !20. 06_ 
59.381 	78.13 1 
42.08 	5.00 1 
1333 1 _._. 16.06  
1.20: 	-1.40;  
30.83; 	15.00! 
8.751 	6.001 
86.67 i 	68.75 1 
47.50! 	52.001 
_ 	25,631 	23E- 
_-_-4-2.501 _.-1-57001 
--9. -40 	1.00i 
1:52LD42:: 
02L D20. . 
:62L D28!: • • 
76-2L b01!:!..! 46.67: 	44.001 	46.67 , .28,33..J.1 
102LD37.1... 
1 , 
16.601 	-1-27601 	15.831 	50.06 .: 
89.-501 	55.00i 	86.25. 	12.501 
35.001 	62.001 	61.67! 	53.751 
100.001 	100.00: 	100.00! 	5.001 
02L DO---9 • • ! 
.02L-D2.1 . 
1 02 LD08 : 70.001 	92.50! 	92.001 	98.751 	75.00!  .
35-.001 	93,75! 	78.001 	57.56 . 	25.06 
---. - 	172-51_ 	0.001 - 27,0-01 	17.501 _.2000 
!b2L DO2 [ , 
!02L D22:!:.!1:: 	:. 
62L 043 .: 25.00 ! 	80:001 	-1-0.061 	5600! 	--1-0.0011-6-6:66; 
02L D40 [. 12.50! 	local 	 100.06 	100.061 	100.00! 	25.001 	93.801 	51.25 1 ; 
38.75 i 	48.06 	56.671 	82.501 	80.001 	81.67 [ 	25.001 	84.00! 	44.17 ; .02L D31.• 
02L D03 	. . ........ . 14.581 	9.88i 	11.171 	82.501 	80.001 	75.001 	7.56 	68.75! 	68.33 ,i .. . 
0.2 L D32. ::: 42.501 	40.001 	37.501 	100.001 	86.00 	99.381 	35.00! 	96.00! 	72.50 
:02Lb[1-91••: 
; 
29.501 	0.60 1 	1.671 	75.83 i 	2.001 	56.67 i 	26.671 	99.00 ! 	44.17 
i
,.. . .,. _
62LD29 ': 66.671 	60.001 	62.001  
36.18! 	17.501 	28.75 
100.00! 	92.50! 	100.00 	25.001 
80.001 	100.661 	100.001 	0.00 
_ 100.001_ 100.001 	100.001 	50.001 
100.601 	166.001 	160.00 	12.60! 
45.00! 	0.00 
37.501. 	 37.50 02LD141- : 
.02LD30 !!‘•.'. 
02L D38 
[.!.. •11!  40,001 _25.001 	27.501 
80.00 ! 	-60106 	58.7 5. 
54.001 	50.001 	54.00 
50.00! 	29.17 
-6-0760! 	5-0.60 
.02L D31 . 62.00! 	49.66 	68.001 	58.00! 	54.00! 	44.00 
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Appendix Dl: ANOVAS and Post Hoc Tests 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
Age 
Univariate Tests of Significance for AGE (NEWDATA1.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
' SS !'I. Dg of 
. :1 1 Freedorn Effect 
Intercept  
GROUP  
Error 
22138.17: 1 22138.171 912.5218i 0.000000 
77.76! 
1140.24: 471 
77.761  
24.26!, 
3.2052 1 0.079846 
GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=3.2052, p=.07985 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
GROUP -AGE 	AGE! 
Mean I Std.Err. , 
'.AGE 
95.00%1!+95.00% 
2252000j  985097L20.53824! 24.50176 
20.00000 1.0054111 17.97737; 22.02263 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
1 
2 
25 
24 
Effect 
Level of 
Factor I 	Mean  
-AGE 
,Std.Dev 
AGE. - 
-Std:Err 
21.28571 5.03736C1 0.7196a 49 
22.5200(1 6.26578C  1.25315€ 
20.0000C 2.93405E: 0.598912 
11,25 
2I 24 :GRQQ1 . 
NART 
Univariate Tests of Significance for NART (NEW DATA1.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
 
 
      
Effect 
 
SS 	. Degr. of - 
Freedom 
  
      
      
Intercept  
GROUP 
Error 
55194.56 
0.60 
1349.401 
GROUP; LS Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=.02096, p=.88552 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
GROUP ' NART NART 
Mean I Std Err 
NAOT' 
795.00% 
- :NART! 
+95:60% 
33.68000! 1.0716461 31.5241_3135.83587  25 
33.45833 1.0937441 31.25800 35.65866 24  
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
1LeVet of 
!!! Factor 
! 49 
25 
2! 24 
NART 
33.571431 
33 680 001 
33.458331 
. StdrDeVI . :! 
NART NART- 
'-9510-0%- 
NART 
+95:00% . 
5.303301 0.757614! 32.04814 35.09471 
5 588083! t11761 
5.1073621 1.042536! 
31 37335' 35 98665 
31.30168: 35.61498 
Effect 
Total  
GROUP  
GROUP' 
120 
GROUP; LS Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=.23531, p=.62987 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
2 
10.64000 0.525325 9.5831831 11.69682 
10.75000, 0.5361571 9.6713911 11.82861 
Digit Span 
Univariate Tests of Significance for DS (NEWDATA1.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposi ion 
SS, 	Degr. of 	MS.!: 
-• , Freedom Effect 
5602.434; 
  0.148, 
324.2601 
11  5602.434 812.04711 0.000000 
	
11 	0.148 	0.0215! 0.884118 
471 	6.899 
:GROUP 
:Dior  
Intercept  
GROUP; LS Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=.02148, p=.88412 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
:GROUP 	S 
I -Mean 
'DS 
Std. Err: 
DS 
-95.00% 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
, Leye1 .1of 	N 	b$: 
Factor : 	Mean 
DS 
Std.Dev. 
S. 
Std. Err -95.00% 
DS 
+95.00°A; Effect 
Total ;  
GROUP  
GROUP 
10.693881 2.5997121 0.371387 9.94715a 11.44060 
10.640001 2.325224 1 0.465045 9.68019• 11.59981 
10.750001 2.9080101 0.5935951 9.522055 11.97794 
9 
1 1 25 
2! 24 
25 
24 
Spatial Span 
Univariate Tests of Significance for SS (NEWDATAl.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
S 	bege: of 
11FreedOnn Effect 
Intercept 
GROUP.  
Error 
5821.045! 11 5821.0451 
1.6161 
847.35741 
0.23531 . 0.629871 
0.000000 
1.6161 
322.8731 
11 
471 6.8701 1 
1 	10.72000 0.5242001 9.665451 11.77455 25 
2 	11.08333 0.5350101 10.007031 12.15963 24 
Descriptive Statistics (NEW DATA1.STA) 
Level Of 1 - N 	SS . 
Factor, 	Meari Std:Dev. Std:Err !...795:00%!1;495 7.00%1 
1 49 10.89796 2.6000391 0.3714341 10.15114 1 11.64478 
 	11 25 
2! 24 
10.72000 
11.08333 
2.5086521 0.501730 	9.68448j 11.75552 
2.7333161 0.557936 	9.92916 1 12.23751 
Effect 
Total  
'GROUP  
GROUP 
121 
Univariate Tests of Significance for BDI (NEWDATA1.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Dew. of , :1 
Freedorn::.L. Effect 
SS 
Intercept  
GROUP 
E'rror.  
2771.043. 1; 2771.0431 81.76776; 0.000000 
321.4111 1; 321.4111 9.48416 0.003457 
1592.793! 471 33.889; 
Univariate Tests of Significance for BAI (NEWDATA1.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Freedom' Effect 
	
1786.361! 	1  1786.3611_75.666081 0.000000 
180.4021 1  180.402 7.641391 0.008122 
1109.5981 	47 	23.608 
BDI-II 
Cell No 
GROUP; LS Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=9.4842, p=.00346 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
'GROUP 
- 
, 	- BD(?. 
Mead' 
',- ppi. , -z. 
.''.-Std.Err.;:::: 
BDI 
795.00%'-11-95.00% 
BDI 	.. , 
! 
1 4.96000 1.1642891  2.617753 
10.08333 1.188297, 7.692787 
7.30225 
12.47388 
25 
24 2 
Effect 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
- Level of , 
!- -.!!-Fadtbf - ban.,:., 
BDI - 	.,, 	-'-'. 
;Std:Dei.:,. 
I 
Std Err ' 
 - 
_795.00%. 
' 	I 
495.00%! 
TFOtar 1 491 	7.469391 6.3150021 0.9021431 5.655507f 	9.28327 
'diRoilp:', 11 25 4.96000 4.650090 0.930018 3.040537 	6.87946 
GROUP 2, 24 10.08333 6.8328911 1.394758; 7.198056 , 12.96861 
BAI 
GROUP; LS Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=7.6414, p=.00812 
Effective hypothesis decomposition .. 
..GROUP.; : BAI . 	_ 	, 	.., 	: 
Cell No.  
I BAI, 	AL ', '.' 
1 4.120000 0.971771 2.165049 6.074951 25 
2 7.958333 0.991810 5.9630701 9.953597 24 
Effect 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) ,, , 	.,.. 
Level of ; 
'.-:Factor .' 
: N 
. 	' 
BAI 
.1Mean- -,, ; 
, 	p. ) 
i1d.DeV.‘,.: ,:`Std:Err.: 
BAI _ _ 
:!: 
, 
Al 3 
-95.06% . ,+95.00%; 
Total, -, .--": I 49 6.0000001 5.1841101 0.7405871 4.5109501 7.489050 
GRO00 ,, 1; 25 4.120000 5.190697 1.038139 1 1.977386 6.262614 
, GROUP 21 24 7.9583331 4.486493 0.9158021 6.0638531 9.852813 
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Univariate Tests of Significance for PADTOT (NEWDATA1.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Degr. of _ 
Freedomi Effect 
- SS 
	
30057.641 	1 1 30057.64 300.0997 0.000000 
15610.37j 1.1 15610.37 155.8562 0.000000 
4707.47i 	471 	100.16 
Intercept.: 
GROUP - 
Degr.otz . 
Fidedorn1" Effect 
Intercept:;: 
Error,. 
4266.6671 11 4266.667 390.64941 0.00 
3401.3611 11 3401.3611 311.4233; 0.00 
513.333; 471 10.9221 
Padua Total Score 
Cell No 
GROUP; LS Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=155.86, p=.00000 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
GROUP 
'::- 	: 
PADTOT 1 
Mean '' 
PADTOT, 
Std Err 
:pADT017- 
,,-95:00%. 
PAO-soT:,:r9 
+95 00% 
.r.' 1 6.92000 2.0015881 	2.893321 10.94668 
42.62500 2.0428621 38.515291 46.73471 
25 
24 
Effect 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Level of , 
. .Factor :. 
'N 
' ' 
PAbT0t 
'Mean 1 ?StdiDev...,1 1='Std;Err 
;-PAOT07 . ,"PAD-7107171PADTOT 
' .:. 95.61:i% 
P,ADTOT; 
.4-65.0-06g 
1 49 24.408161 20.573971 2.939139 18.498631 30.31770 
GROUP,: 1 	25 6.92000__4.923751 0.984750  
42.62500, 13.393101 2.733854 
4.887581 	8.95242 
36.969591 48.28041 GROUP  24 
Padua Checking Score 
Univariate Tests of Significance for PADCH (NEWDATA1.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
GROUP; LS Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=311.42, p=0.0000 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
•GRoup ,,F,)Acicil:i '.:FAO:c1-1 -, -iE, 'A:Dc}-1 ii-,N , ,,,P,Apco 
Cell No .'..:' 	, 	:I': - Mri',:".1 Std Err 95 00% :+9 5 ,codk 
. 1:: „ ,, 	, 1 i.00pool 11660969j -0.329701, 2.329,70 25 
717.666671 0.6745981 16.309551 1-6.02378 24 
Effect 
Descriptive S atistics (NEWDATA1.STA) . 	. 
Level of . 
1- .Factor..' 
, N 
- 	' 
pAochi. 
.;Men:!--11 Std . be-v.; 
PADc171=.11P,AkDCH‘... PADCH 
'- Std Err ' ', -95:00% 1 
PADCH 
:-i-95'-.00% , 
Total -,', '. 1 4911 	9.163271 9.0308431 1.2901201 6.56930 11.75723 
GROUP _ 1j25 
21 24 
1.000001 1.0801231 0.2160251 
17.666671 4.593631! 0.9376711 
0.554151 
15.726951 
1.44585 
19.60639 GROUP 
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CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=62.656, p=0.0000 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
Q1OFFC 
Q1ONC 
Q1USC 
3.415552 _ 
4.535117 
1.855351 
49 
49 
49 
CON*SET; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=3.8131, p=.02557 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
11 Q1OFFC 
11 Q1ONC 
_alusc 
Q1OFFC 
Q1ONC 
21 Q1USC 
_2.869565 23 
4.608696 23 
1.826087 23 
3.961538 26 
4.461538 26 
1.884615 26 
MANIPULATION CHECK FOR SET 
Ql. Mean No. Correct 
Effect 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATP 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
l 	Degr. 1 of." . 	... 	- , 
'Freedom 
M 
intercerit•1564.694 111564.69411447.5741 0.000000 , 
s'ET,,- 4.095 	1 	4.0951 	3.789 1 0.057590 
'Error 50.803 	47 	1.0811 
CON 
	
176.8581 	88.4291 	 62.656'  0.000000 
10.7631 	21 	5.3821 	3.813; 0.025572 . CON*SET 
Error 132.6661 	941 	1.41111 
Effect 
Descriptive Statistics (NEW DATA1.STA) 
Level of 
'Factor 
N Q10FFCl'Q1bErd Q1ONC 
Mean:: I Std.Dev. 	'Mean 
Q1ONC 1 Q1USC I Q1USC: 
Std.DeV. 	Mean 	i Std.Dev. 
Total. , 49 3.4489801 1.1376371 4.530612 0.680136 1.85714a 1.541104 
SET 
 
11 23 2.8695651 1.0997661 4.608696; 0.5830271 1.8260871 1.613922 
Descriptive Statistics (NEW DATA1.STA) 
,Level of 'N .01;OFFC , Qt.OFEC Q1ONC Q1ONC, plUSC 01USC,. 
Effect ..:7-Factor . Meah'::, tc1,,Qe),i. :': Mean Sid.Dev2 'Mean ' ;Std.Dev.n. 
Total - 49 3.448980' 1.137637 4.5306121 0.680136 1.8571431 1.541104 
•SET1, 1 	23 2.8695651 1.099766' 4.6086961  1.8260871 1.613922 
SET ,, 2 26 3.9615381 0.9156751 4.461538: 0.7605671 1.8846151 1.505375 
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SET; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA; 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=4.2521, p=.04475 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
SET]; •DV1• 
Mean Cell No. 
48.10158 23 
64.13404 26 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
SS 	Degr. of 
'I Freedom 1 Effect 
652900.1, 
4616.1: 
61670.7. 
424.7' 
90.8! 
14226.11 
11 652900.11 497.5830! 0.000000 
	
ii 	4616.11 	3.51801 0.066926 
471 	1312.11 
	 21 	212.4 	1.4032 0.250905 
	 21 	45.41 0.3000 0.741498 
941 	151.31 
Intercept  
'SET  
ErrOr. ' 
CON ;:.:  
CON''SET  
Error , 
Q2. Mean Discomfort 
Effect 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATP 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
-1! begr. of 
'' I : Freedom ' 
Intercept 7 461198.4: 	1 461198.41 208.38501 0.000000 
9410,8: 	11941081  _. 4.2521: 0.044754 
104020.6- 	-4-7: 	2213.21 
SET : : 	''' 
Error 
COW 279.9- 21 	140.01 	1.16103 0.317637 
1.7, 	21 	0.81 	0.00701. CON SET 
Error - „: 11333.1 94; 	1206.; 
Effect 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Level of 
'Factor 
1,N 020FF '1 020FF - 
Mean ' 1Std.Dev. , 
Q2ON 
Mean : 
020N-: 
Std.Dev: 
Q2US 1 ' Q2US 
Mean 	Std:DeV. 
Total; 49 58.41344: 29.47696! 55.04239 28.71638 56.369971 30.09608 
SET :E 
SET .2  1; 23 
2; 26 
49.76703! 31,57507 
66.062181 25.715771 
46.53575 31.48407 1,48,0019_61_32.90850 
63.772441 25.78107 62.56750 24.197681 
Q3. Cost of Danger 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Level of -1 N, Q3ACFF 0 .313OFF: d38C5N '03:B:ON Q3E3US. •::apBps', 
Effect ‘Factor ;Mean ! - Sid.bev. , Mean!. Std.bev. 'Mean. ;Std.ciev.! 
Total:- : 49 68.973641 22.454011 64.79660 24.844801 67.570411 23.61775 
SET: 1123 61.840584_27.65979; 59.31667; 26.716071 62.309421 27.25086 
SET!? 2 26 75.283651 14.372031 69.644231 22.471801 72.224361 19.22204 
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Effect 
Q3c. Probability of Danger 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
' 
fFreedbm 
Intercept  
SET 
Error:: : ;  
'CON 
'COW:SET  
:Error . 
167865.2 1 11 167865.2 124.9493 0.000000 
526.0 5264, 0.3915 0.534537 
63142.9 , 471 1343.5 1 
1778.3. 21 889.2; 10.20751 0.000097 
349.9 	 2-1 	174.91 2.00831 0.139931 - 94:r 8188.3 87.11 
CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=10.207, p=.00010 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
CON: DVL1 
Mean 
Q3COFF 36.63911 49 
Q3CON 28 :94245 49 
Q3CUS 35.98679 49 
Cell No. 
49 
49 
49 
72.96210 
62.09351 
70.71105 
Q3d. Personal Responsibilit 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
1Freediom Effect 
Intercept 
SET  
Error:  
'CON.  
CON*.SET  
Error 
688959.8: 
6818.11 
1„688959.81 -r 1, 	6818.11 
313.7641 
3.1051 
0.000000 
0.084552 
103202.11 47-1- 2195-1.81 
3213.0: 
226.81 
16908.21 941 
1606.51 
113.41 
179.9! 
8.93131 
0.6305i 
0.000281 
0.534546 
CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA, 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=8.9313, p=.00028 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
03DOFF 
Q3DON 
Q3DUS 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Levelof 	N . Q3COFF. - Q3COFF I 03 1CON . Q3CON 	Q3CUS . : Q3OUS 
Effect Factor - Mean: Std.Dev. 	Mean Std.Dev. 	Mean Std.Dev: 
-Total 49 36.62136 22.53452 1 29.12874 1 22.37672! 36.16633 1 22.26637 
SET. -   1_23 36.92890 .2.3.81768, 25.89964; 22.13395L33.954 .351 23.29716 
SET --2-. -26 -31.985-2-672-2.63133:1 36.34923i 21.80-8- 55, 	 38.919231 21.38928 
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Q4. Memory Certaint 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Effect 
•Intercept  
SET I.::: 
Error.  
CON  
CON*SET  
Error 
499935.6! 11 499935.61 619.73121 0.000000 
2698.8i 11 2698.81 3.3455i 0.073736 
37914.81 471 806.71 1 
53469.3: 21 26734.61 83.19411 0.000000 
1502.5; 21 751.21 2.33781 0.102133 
30207.1! .94! 321.41 
Q5. Memory Confidence 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Degr. of - 
Freedom Effect 
S 
851668.5 851668.51 898.3167 0.000000 
107.2' 11 107.24 0.1131 0.738145 
44559.4' 471 948.11 
6439.6! 21 3219.81 17.9527 0.000000 
312.4! 21 156.21 0.87091 0.421943 
16858.81 941 179.31 
Intercept  
SET 
Error  
CON  
CON*SET 
ErrOr. 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Level of N Q3DOFF Q3DOFF, Q3DON1-- .-.03DON r '03DUS :;-Q3DUS ' 
Effect , :Factor , : - 1 	::Mean --, -..: Std:DeV:- r‘ken: !,= :Std.Dev. 	-Mean ',-- Std.Dev.:, 
Total 49 73.42007 27.31205 62.57772 31.915231 71.022111 29.74114 
SET 1:23 65.481881 31.76424! 54.18478,_34.261711 65.630431 32.36836 
SET -- 21 26 80.442311 20.85837: 70.002241 28.293841 75.791671 26.94288 
Cell No. 
CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=83.194, p=0.0000 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
,CON :DV 1 - 
Mean 
1: 040FF 
040N 
35.26550 
82.06248 
57.95313 
49 
49 
49 Q4US 
Descriptive Statistics (NEW DATA1.STA) 
:Level of N 040FF 1 040FF- 	Q4ON 040N . Q4US Q4U5 
Effect 1 ' Factor 	i Mean 	I Std:Dev.H 	Mean: Std.Dev1 -iK/len - Std.Dev. - 
Total : 49 34.76105; 22.79926: 81.80255 20.57825; 57.92901 23.73739 
SET c 1; 23 43.50471; 21 : 1868406.30797_19.13359158.34696 25.28496 
2: SET ' 
 
27.026281 21.690011 77.81699 21.346991 57.559291 22.78021 
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CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA, 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=17.953, p=.00000 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
CON 
Cell No. 
1  Q5OFF 
Q5ON 
Q5US 
72.19758 
85.61017 
70.96979 
49 
49 
49 
Q6. Desire to Check 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEW DATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition  
Degr. of 
,Freedom , Effect 
Intercept 
ET 
trror  
CON: 
.CON*SET 
	
373414.01 	1 	373414.0 
5600.81 	 1 	5600.8 
116939.71 	47 	2488.1 
2 
94 
150.08131  0.000000 
2.25101 0.140213 
1 
21.14481 0.000000 
0.70021 0.499062 
5117.1 
169.4 
242.0 
10234.11 
338.91 
22748.01 
CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA, 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=21.145, p=.00000 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
06OFF 
Q6ON 
Q6US 
58.73460 
39.03352 
53.71819 
49 
49 
49 
2 
Effect 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
'Level of 	1. N 
. 1:Factor 	1, I
, 050FF, • 
Mean 11 - 
1050FF. 
Std.DeV.-,-, 
1 .,:050N1.,. 
'1... Meer '' 
.. 	....,  :-..050N - 
Std:Dev. - 
-. Q5US'," 
; Mean:: 
; Q5US , 
Std:DeV. 
Totat , 1 49 72.25510 1 19.489951 85.55697 18.607781 70.808301 23.71033 
1: 23 71.25797 1  18.895831 86.478991 18.897041 73.60754L 24.56628 
23.12395 SET '' 2! 26 73.137181 20.33218 1 84.741351 18.683651 68.332051 
Effect 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
,Level Of!: Nt -060FF :. ,060FF 
- FaCtor1;..-•;1 ., 1;Meah 11 Stsa.ljeV 
: 1,.0 .60N1 :,• r.(:)6(:),N::i .96VS_.:,: Q6US: 
.--,Mer.i.'-',''Std.DeN; 	Mean' -, Sid.`1:561:Std.Ef'11 495:00°, 
;,Q6US'' ,' 1 ,061JS:;- 
Total 1 	4,. 59.24061 28.93161 39.31951 34.01911 54.06191 32.2422 4.60604 63.3230 
SET,,,?: 11 2C 50.4692 31.66541 
67.00001 24.31751 
34.36151 
43.70541 
35.46371 
32.75111 
48.1030 33.385816.961431 62.5401 
59.33331 30.879316.055941 71.8057 1 SETe , 21 26 
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SS Degr. of 
Freedom 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
1575.2081 111575.208 1576.718! 0.000000 
7.94317 1_ 7.943 7.951_10.007016 
46.955! 47, 0.999 
177.2751 88.6371 58.14510.000000 
0.132j 2: 0.0661 0.04310.957678 
143.297! 94; 1.524! 
Effect 
Intercept.  
GROUP  
Error' 
CON 
tON*GROUP 
Error 
GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA; 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=7.9506, p=.00702 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
3.506667 
3.041667 
25 
24 
CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA, 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=58.145, p=0.0000 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
gioffc 
bionic 
01USC 
_3.445000 
4,525833 
i.851667 
49 
49 
49 
CON*GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=.04326, p=.95768 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
DV 1 - 
-Mean 
GROUP CON, 
01OFFC 3.640000 25 
,plo..Np. 4.760000 _25 
Q1USC 2.120000 25 
Q1OFFC 3.250000 24 
Q1ONC 4.291667 24 
Q1USC 1.583333 24 
Cell No. 
GROUP COMPARISONS 
Ql. Mean No. Correct 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
:Level of N Q1OFFC Q1OFFCI d1ONd::-, Q1ONC. , Q1_USC; - .01'_use-: 
Effect ;Factor  Men Std:Dev. 	earl'. Std.Dev. Meari:::: St‘cl:De'V.:' 
Total 49 3.448980; 1.1376371 4.53061210.680136; 1.857143i 1.541104 
GROUP . 1- 25 3.640000j 1.0360181  4.760000 0.43589012.1200001 1.536229 
GROUP! 2 24 3.250000 1.224745! 4 291667 1 0.806450 1.58333311.529895 
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N. DV 1: - 
1 25 1VV. 	 VS 
":. 24 
46.26759 
66.75697 2 
GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 45)=8.5394, p=.00542 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
sET 
, Cell No. 
SET; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 45)=4.7265, p=.03500 
Effective hypothesis decomposition  
48.89053 
64.13404 
23 
26 
BDI-II ANCOVA 
Effect 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition . _ 	. 
. Test Value's', , F 
', 
, :Effect= 
--, df--;''' 
Error. 
.:I-tlf 	• 
- 	' 	 ..-  „ 
.- 	., 	- 
Intercept Wilks_, 
Wilks 
Wilks 
0.036102 
0.922066 
391.59094_1 _ 	31 	44' 0.000000 
BDI , 1.23961 	31 	44 0.306772 
GROUP -. 0.797332 	3.72801 	31 	44 0.017937 
BAI ANCOVA 
Effect 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATA1.STA1 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
;Test; 
: . i,- 	,-.•,:::- :2-1 
	
- - Value, 	-,,F - 	 ,,,tEffe.0'. 
: 	 ....1 ,, 1'. .' .d1:-;;I 
:g -r;r6r 	,;...:.: 	- 	: 
i,..:I!df ,. 
intercept Wilks 0.034832: 406.4030  
Wilks1 0.997703j- 	0.0338  
Wilksi 0.8107631 	3.4233 
3  
3 
441 0.000000 
44 0.991556 
44 1 0.025183 
'13AI: 	I,71 '- -,` I':", 
GROUP 1,.' 
2. Discomfort 
Effect 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition .. . 
SS 
V 
De-g rz-':'p 
Intercept V 467235.5 1 467235.5 I 259.8468 , 0.000000 
GROUP ,;- --,- ' . 15354.9 1 1 15354.9 I 	8.5394 0.005419 
8498.8 1 
, 
8498.8 : 	4.7265 0.035000 
'.GRI0015."-rSET 9133.41 1, 9133.41 	5.0794 0.029130 
'En'or''.': I.' - ''' 	- 80915.4 451 
, 
1798.11 
CON .----= -,- ...--- - 268.71 
85.01 
2 1 
2 
134.4 1i 	1.0827 
42.51 	0.3424 
0.343034 
0.710972 ..edialEiouts :, .,.: 
-CONtEt.:, 	: 2.81 j 	1.41 	0.0114 0.988703 
-CON,ORouP*SEt ;.1;: 90.01 , i	45.0 I 	0.36251 0.696959 , 
Error-.::,:':::: . : 11167.81 go! 124.1 I 
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GROUP*SET; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 45)=5.0794, p=.02913 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
GROUP_ SET, 
Cell No. 
30.74468 
61,79051 
67.03638 
66.47756 
1-. 
2: 
12 
_13 
11 
13 
Effect 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
,Level off: 
Factor, 
Level of :I', N 
Factar'• i 
0C10..:: 
Meari. 
.ORQ('. 
StcLbei .L 
' ,:020W:f.:;C)61` :211:.5'02U$.:: : I: :-Q2 U§=';'. 
Mean' :' l'SttriDev.4:4viedn:.1,Sid.DeVg.:', 
Total : 1 49 58.41344129.47696! 55.04239 28.71638: 56.36997 30.09608 
.diROUP 1; i 25 
i 24 
49.6106732,21523!_45.18320 
67.58299; 23.63114165.31239 
28,98560 
25.07109! 
45.87167! 
67.30569i 
30.32977 
26-.18842 'GROUP ir 
' .SET 1; ! 23 
! 26 
49.76703131.57507146.53575 
66.06218! 25.71577! 62.56750: 
31.48407! 48.0019E! 32.9085C 
24.19768163.77244125.78107 SET. . 	, 2! 
GROUP SET  
bAbLii.*.t.i 
1 I . 	_ 	.. . 102 
2113 
34.43542! 28,139601,.28.50000) 23.9,1462 
-63.6 -185,9' 3-0.1162160.58-30-8 ,--24.9i6k  
6649242  2706590  66.2-1-111: 2711946 , 
68.50577: 21.39728164.55192' 24.29990 
29.29861i 25.28041 
61.1-69-87! 26-.6396-6- 
-68.40661128.3 -161-6 
66.3750C 25.38297 
2! 
1L 
ORbi•J':SEt 15-1 
2! 13 rGROUSET- 7! 
Newman-Keuls test; variable DV_1 (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Approximate Probabilities for Post Hoc Tests 
Error: Between MS = 1798.1, df = 45.000 
.GROUP :E:t-- ' - {1} ,{2) 	- (p) 	' 	 {4) . 
Cell No. - 30.745 - 61:791 67.036 :. 66.478. 
. 
'751"  
1  1 0.003208_1 0.003679_! 0,00231 
i 	2 0.003208 	1 __,,j 0.857606  
_ 0.003679 2 L_ ! 0.857606 	' ' 0.95541 , 
2! 	2 0.002311 	1 0.638842 	i 0.955414 	' 
BDI-II ANCOVA 
Effect 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Test, 	Value : F Effect . 
 f 
Error . 	, 
,df 	S j 
Intercept - Wilksi 0.398175 22.16809! 	 3J 
31 
441  
441 
441 
0.000000 
0.080654 :BDI Wilks1 0.859415 2 3992i 
GROU ,Pi Wilks1 0.869270 2.205721 31 0.100807 
BAI ANCOVA 
Effect 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATA1.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Test 1 	 Va lue . 	„ 
-, 
Effect . 
•:. 
-E rror  , 
...df ::: 
.Intercept : Wilks! 0.364144; 25.61039 ; 3' 	441 0.000000 
3 	441_0.445545 
3 	441 0.092324 
BAI - 
	
Wilks1 0.9417801 	°90669L 
Wilksi 0.8653621 	2.281921 GROUP' 
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Effect 
Q3b. Cost of Danger 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
SS 
•Freedom.. 
Intercept  
GROUP  
Error  
CON 
1C.ON. 1`,GROUP, 
Eh'dr ! 
	
664779.6! 	1 
7788.81 
58498.0; 
	
47 
435.1; 
205.21 -+ 
14111.8! 
664779.6 534.1144 0.000000 
7788.8_ 6.2578 15905 
1244.6 
217.6: 	1.4492 0.239965 
102.6,  0.6833 0.507424 
150.11 941 
CON*GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATAl.STA 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=.68333, p=.50742 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
1; Q3BOFF 
Q3BON 
Q3BUS 
Q3BOFF 
Q3BON 
Q3BUS 
61.76833 25 
56.28500 25 
61.89133 25 
76.47917 24 
73.66285 24 
73.48611 24 
GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=6.2578, p=.01590 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
'GROUP DV_ 1.DV .;DV_1 
Cell No Mean Std Err -95.00% +95:00%. 
59 98156 4.073719! 51 78629 1 68.17682 25 
74.54271 4.157722166.i78451 82.90697 24 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Level of -N 1Q3B0FF j.Q3BOFF- ,.- 	- apboN '03BON Q3BUS 2 Q3BUS 
Effect . Factor l- 	Mean 	; I Std.Dev. :Mean - 	Std.Dev: .--Mean :Std.Dev. 
Total 149 68.97364!, 22.45401 	64.796601  24.844801 67.57041! 23.61775 
GROUP 1; 25 61.76833426.449161 56.28500 29.04485 61.89133128.36112 
GROUP 2! 24 7647917114.38819173.66285! 15.72089! 73.48611115.91232 
BDI-II ANCOVA 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEW DATA1.STA: 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
- Test i 	Value 	F Effect Error. 
Effect - df. ; f 
Intercept ', Wilks10.208986' 55.51334! 441 0.000000 
BDI ! , Wilks ! 0.798591, 	3.699021 441 0.018522 
bR000, -1- Wilks 	0.859938 , 	2.388831 3r 	44; 0.081624 
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25 
25 
25 
24 
24 
24 
34.65433 
28.70700 
35.82833 
38.67035 
29.56806 
36.51840 
1736.61 
85.9; 
8452.3! 
	
868.31 	9.6564! 0.000153 
21 	42.9; 	0.4776' 0.621739 
94 	89.9; 1 
Q3c. Probability of Danger 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
- Degr. 
.,Freed6m Effect 
Intercept  
'GROUP 
Error ,  
CON  
1CON*GFiOUR 
Error 
169772.1 	 1 	169772.11 125.5742! 0.000000 
126.5 	1 	126.51 	0.0936L0,761039 
63542.41 	47 	1352.01 
CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATALSTA: 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=9.6564, p=.00015 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
Q3COFF 
Q3CON 
Q3CUS 
49 
-6 
49 
36: 66234 
29.13753 
36.17337 
CON*GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=.47765, p=.62174 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
'GROUP :1 CON 	-DV 
1 	1 ::Mean 
	 1= Q3COFF 
11 Q3CON 
11 Q3CUS 
2! Q3COFF 
2!  Q3CON 
2i Q3CUS 
BAI ANCOVA 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATAl.STA: 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Effect 
'Test :' 	Value . . 	, 
- 	:1 	., 
-, 	, 
df- - 
1fte'am: 1 Eil'orj , 	. 
. 	df 	.1 
Intercept - 1 Wilks 1 0.188849. 62 99664 3 1 	441 o.pop000 
BAI 	.1': Wilks 1 0.876962:  . psoo _441_0.11 
GROUP Wilks 	0.833220= 	2.935731 31 	44! 0.043652 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Level of = I :=N 1Q3COFf 103COF 1F11::.Q3CON 03CON=:::.:Q3CU-S11 =.03p.ps:. 
Effect •:.Factor ; I 	Mean . ' 'Std:Dev . 1'; , Mean . StiiDeV.;; ;,.Mdarii!':., ;: ;Std-bev.: . 
Total..:::- i 49 36.62136; 22.534521 29.12874, 22.37672 36.166331 22.26637 
bFibu0::- 11 25 34.,654331 22.661271 28.707001479114; 35.828331 23.81283 
GROUP 2; 24 38.67035' 22.70064; 29.568061 22.417871 36.518401 21.04130 
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25 60.44356 
77.92650 24 
GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=5.3417, p=.02525 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATALSTA, 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=8.7551, p=.00033 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
03DOFF 
Q3DON 
Q3DUS 
73.60278 
62.78186 
71.17045 
49 
49 
49 
CON*GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=.51675, p=.59814 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
5 
6 
11 03DOFF 
Q3DON 
Q3DUS 
2.] Q3DOFF 
Q3DON 
Q3DUS 
25 
25 
25 
24 
24 
24 
64.65000 
52.77900 
63.90167 
82.55556 
72.78472 
78.43924 
Q3d. Responsibility 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Degr:-Or. 
,Freedom Effect 
Intercept  
GROUP -  
Error 
703332.5 
11228.1  
98792.0 
1 703332.51 334.6082 0.000000 
	
1 11228.11 		5.3417 0.025255 
47: 	2102.0! 
3157.2' 	21 	1578.614 	8.75511 0.000326 
186.3 	2 	93.21 	0.5168  0.598139 
16948.71 	94; 	180.3! 
CON 
CON*GROUP 
Error  
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Level of , 	. QS:DOFF, „:9:3DO,EFi, 03,00k, :- . 133,DON: , :,7:03_12US -;:Qqpi.is . 
Effect 'Factor  Meaii: ' :Std. DeV: ; :-: Mear•Std:DeV::: - Mean 'Stcl:Dev.. -- 
Totar- 1 49i 73.420071 27.31205: 62.577721 31.91523! 71.022111 29.74114 
GROUP: 11 25 _64.65000 29.01828 52.77900 33.287601 .63.901674_31,69773 
GROUP 21 24 82.55556 22.52558 72.784721 27.50306: 78.439241 26.17327 
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49 
49 
49 
34.64644 
81.69196 
57.87758 
Q4. Memory Certainty 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Degr: 	MS' 
Freedom 
SS 
Effect 
495529.9, 1; 495529.9i 619.1900; 0.000000 
3000.1 3000.11 3.74881„ 0.058872 
37613.5 471 800.31 
54205.61_ 2! 27102.81 81.096110.000000 
294.3! 147.11 0.440310.645181 
31415.31 94; 334.21 
Intercept ! 
'GROUP 
Error 
CON 
CON*GROUP  
Error 
CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA, 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=81.096, p=0.0000 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
,CON 	DV -1 N .  
Mean Cell No. 
Q4OFF 
Q4ON 
Q4US 
CON*GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA; 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=.44027, p=.64518 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
GR0UP1 -  
- 1 
1: Q4OFF 
Q4ON 
Q4US 
2 Q4OFF 
Q4ON 
Q4US 
DV 
Mean 
40.26267 
87.11100 
60.39800 
29.03021 
76.27292 
55.35715 
25 
25  
25 
24 
24 
24 
Cell No. 
BDI-II ANCOVA 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Test 	Value F Effect - Error 
Effect !, 	, :: 	df ; ; ,: 	di 1 :1-: 
Intercept Wilks10.283781, 37.01643 	3 	441 0.00000o 
BDI 	- Wilks: 0.899722 1.634661 	3 	4410.195022 
GROUP - Wilks! 0.913225: 1.39364 	3 	44i 0.257322 
BA! ANCOVA 
Effect 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
., 
 
Test 	Value F Effect 
df, - . 
Eir61. " 
df - . 
Intercept - Wilks ,i 0..247413  
Wilks 1 0.9792251 
44.613401  
0.311171 
31 
31 
441 0.000000 
44 , 0.817187 
4410.109023 
BAI 
'GROUP. Wilks10.872780: 2.137871 31 
135 
Q5. Memory Confidence 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Effect 
49 
49 
49 
72.27065 
85.47387 
70.76650 
intërcept  
'GROUP::  
odWdko.',00i: 
Error 
11 852527.1 906.5791! 0.000000 
	
it 	468.8! 	0.49851 0.483626 
471 	940.4; 
6414.6 	21 	3207.31 18.16841 0.000000 
577.3 21 	288.6 	1.63501 0.200448 
16593.9 	941 	176.5, 
852527.1 
468.8 
44197.8 
CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=18.168, p=.00000 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
05OFF 
Q5ON 
Q5US 
Effect 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Level of 
Factor 
N; -Q4OFF . 
' Mean. 
- Q4OFF. ' , 
Std.Dev. - 
'04ON' 
, Mean -  
- 040N . 
•Std.Dev..' 
Q4US 
Mean 
, Q4US 
-Std.Dev. 
Total' I 49 34.76105; 22.79926 81.802551 20.57825 1 57.92901i 23.73739 
GROUP 1125 40.26267 , 23.81781 1 87.111001 
--1 76.272921 1---- 
17.898361 60.39800 24.45541 
GROUP 2 24 
i 
29.03021; 20.63225 ; 22.06663 55.35715; 23.20186 
BDI-II ANCOVA 
Effect 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
„ Test , 	. ,' Value 1' .. Effect - 
df ' 
ErrOrr :, 
df :'.... 
Intercept . Wilks 	0.112334: 115.89611 	31J000000 
Wilks 	0.899496! 	1.63881 	3r ! 	44 0.194102 
Wilks i 0.8973221 	1.67831 	31 	441 0.185448 
'BDI 	' ' . 
P.. •GROU
, 
BA! ANCOVA 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATA1.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
; Te -st. , 1 Value  E're.61=:= 
Effect :df  
'IntbrCe0t 1.' Wilks1 0.131155i 97.16034 31 441 0.000000 
Wilks1 0.833377: 	2.93240 31 441 0.043818 
bFio-uk: Wilks; 0.829668! 	3.011091 3, 44 0.040072 
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CON*GROUP; LS Means (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=1.6350, p=.20045 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
DV.4 
Mean 
1 Q5OFF 
1 Q5ON . 	. 
Q5US 
2 Q5OFF 
21 Q5ON 
2! Q5US 
71:50900 25 
89 54600 25 
72.81467 25 
73.03229 24 
81.40174 24 
68.71833 24 
3 
4:  
5  
6 
1 
2 
41.77178 
60.35560 
25 
24 
GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA: 
Current effect: F(1, 47)=5.4279, p=.02416 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
'GROUP DV 
Mean - Cell No. 
CON; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA, 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=21.613, p=.00000 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
•DV -1. 
Mean 
Q6OFF 
Q6ON 
Q6US 
59.43094 
.39.55336 
54.20677 
49 
49 
49 
Descriptive Statistics (NEWDATA1.STA) 
Level of N -050FF Q5OFF , 	- a5ON . Q5ON ... - Q5US Q50S--, - 	: 	., 
Effect Factor Mean StclID6V: Mean - StclIDev. Mean -Std.Dev.': 
Tbtal--'. i 49 72.255101 19.489951 85.556971 18.60778 70.808301 23.71033 
GROUP 1 25 71.50900.1  19.226421 89.54600 17.63765. 1 72.814671 23,75598 
G ROUP 2 24 73.03229 20.14409! 81.40174! 19.04424! 68.71833! 23.98807 
Q6. Desire to Check 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (NEWD, 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
SS Degr. o f  
Effect Freedom 
Intercept. 383142.9_ 	1 	383142: 9, ,16,.9,24.4 - o.oppc 
GF3;OUP.;.;. 12686.6, 1 	126-8-6.6 1 5.42791 0.0241 
Errcir 109853.8 	47! 	233-7:31 
CON - 10402.2 2 	5201A 	216127 0.000C 
It ON*GROUP  
	
-465.9 	21 	232.9! ..... 	, 0.9680I 0,383E 
-2-26-21:0! 	94! 	240.6! :Error 
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CON*GROUP; Unweighted Means (NEWDATA1.STA1 
Current effect: F(2, 94)=.96798, p=.38360 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
Cell No. 
C) 
50.10667 
28.09700 
47.11167 
68.75521 
51.00972 
61.30188 
ics (NEW 
2.: 
4 
1 060FF 
Q6ON 
1 Q6US 
2 06OFF 
2 060N 
2' Q6US 
Descriptive Statis 
25 
25 
25 
24 
24 
24 , 
ATA1.STA) 
Effect 
Total  
GROUP; 
GROUP' 
Level of I N 
Factor. I 
-06OFF 
Mean 	Std:Dev: 
060N 
Mean 
Q6ON 
Std:Dev. 
Q6US 
Mean ' 
:.b6US 
Std. Dèv 
1 49 59.24065i 28.931631 39.319561 34.01911 54.06197 32.24229 
25 50.10667 30.24012! 28.097001 	47.11167; 35.00861 
68.755211 24.647361 51.009721 30.99838 61.30188127.98991 2i 24 
BDI-II ANCOVA 
Effect 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATA1.STA; 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
. Test 	Value 	F 	Effect , 
i 	df 
Error 
',, df 
Intercept Woks 0.385602 23.369061 	3 	44L0.000000 .._._ 
_Wilksl 0958280'0.638531  	. 44p594251 
-Wilks1 0.861267 	2.36251; 	31 	441 0.084136 
,BDI 
'GROUP 
BAI ANCOVA 
Effect 
Multivariate Tests of Significance (NEWDATA1.STA 
Sigma-restricted parameterization 
Effective hypothesis decomposition 
' Test 	Value 	F 	kfffiect 
I 	df :, 
E rror: 
:cif - 
Intercept..: Wilks 	0.395168, 22.448321 	31 
VVil,ks 0,890575 	1.80210 _3 
	
-W- i-i-ks; 0.8530341 -2-.526471 	31 
441 
441 
441 
0.000000 
0.160729 
0.069645 
BAL 
GROUP , ..,' 
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Appendix D2: Theme Analyses 
Table 8. Theme analysis for Set 1 and Set 2. 
Set 1 (N=23) 
Break- 
in/Theft 
Fire/ 
Burn 
Flood Waste 
water/ 
Run out 
Other Nothing/Is 
locked/Left 
on or open 
Car Door ON 23 
OFF 20 2 1 
US 21 1 1 
Backdoor ON 19 2 2 
OFF 18 0 5 
US 21 1 1 
Oven ON 18 2 3 
OFF 17 3 3 
US 18 2 3 
Heater ON 15 6 2 
OFF 14 6 3 
US 16 4 3 
B/Tap ON 12 9 2 0 
OFF 11 7 3 2 
US 13 7 2 
Set 2 (N=26) 
Car boot ON 25 1 
OFF 22 2 2 
US 23 2 1 
Front door ON 26 
OFF 24 2 
US 24 2 
Hotplate ON 25 1 
OFF 23 1 2 
US 23 1 2 
Iron ON 26 
OFF 24 2 
US 24 2 
Sink tap ON 22 3 1 
OFF 20 5 1 
US 23 3 
Note. 'Other' includes responses such as overheating, feel guilty, waste electricity 
etc. 
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Table 9. Theme Analysis for High and Low Checking rou s. 
High Checkers (N=24) 
Break- 
in/Theft 
Fire/ 
Burn 
Flood Waste 
water/ 
Run out 
Other Nothing/Is 
locked/Left 
on or open 
Car Door/Boot ON 24 
OFF 22 1 1 . 
US 23 1 
Front/B ackdoor ON 24 
OFF 24 
US 24 . 
Oven/Hotplate ON 24 
OFF 24 
US 24 
Heater/Iron ON 21 3 
OFF 23 1 
US 23 
B/K.Tap ON 18 4 2 
OFF 15 5 3 1 
US 19 2 2 1 
Low Checkers (N=25) 
Car Door/Boot ON 24 1 
OFF 20 2 3 
US 22 3 
Front/Back 
door 
ON 21 1 3 
OFF 18 7 
US 21 4 
Oven/Hotplate ON 19 2 4 
OFF 17 3 5 
US 19 2 4 
Heater/Iron ON 18 5 
OFF 14 6 5 
US 16 4 5 
B/K.Tap ON 16 8 1 
OFF 16 7 2 
US 18 7 
Note. 'Other' includes responses such as overheating, feel guilty, waste electricity 
etc. 
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